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EXCEPTIONS: THE CRIMINAL LAW'S ILLOGICAL APPROACH
TO HIV-RELATED AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS
Ari Ezra Waldman*
ABSTRACT

This Article identifies logical and due process errors in HIV-related
aggravated assault cases, which usually involve an HIV-positive
individual having unprotected sex without disclosing his or her HIV
status. While this behavior should not be encouraged, this Article
suggests that punishing this conduct through a charge of aggravated
assault-which requires a showing that the defendant's actions were a
means likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death-is fraught with
fallacies in reasoning and runs afoul of due process. Specifically, some
courts use the "rule of thumb" that HIV can possibly be transmitted
through bodily fluids as sufficient evidence for finding that a particular
HIV-positive defendant who had unprotected sex did so in a manner
likely to cause substantial harm. This leads to two due process errors:
(1) the conflation of what is theoreticallypossiblefor what is likely, and
(2) the use of data about a hypothetical, average,HIV-positive individual
as proofof the effects of a particularHIV-positive individual' behavior
By relying on the rule of thumb that HIV can be transmitted through
bodily fluids rather than investigating the unique features of the
particulardefendant on trial, thesejurisdictions violate the Due Process
Clause s requirement of "personal guilt." Aristotle ' "Fallacy of
Accident" is then committed when this generalization is applied to an
HIV-positive defendant whose viral load is undetectable, making him an
exception to the general rule. After explaining these concepts, this
Article identifies various cases from the states and the military that
commit these errors. These cases are then compared to similar
aggravated assault cases from Canada that do not make the same
mistakes and use the kind ofparticularizedproofthat is requiredby both
common logic and the Due Process Clause.
CONTENTS

Abstract..........................................550
551
........................................
Introduction
I. The Science of the Likelihood of Transmitting HIV........................555
A. Viral Load and T-Cell Count..............................557
559
.....................................
B. Treatment
......... 561
II. The Accident Fallacy ......................
III. Logical "Accident" as a Due Process Problem.............564
............ 566
A. "Anything is Possible" as a Legal Standard........
568
.......................................
B. Guilt is Personal
IV. Logical "Accident" and Due Process Errors in the
Criminalization of HIV Transmission Through the Traditional
572
........................................
Criminal Law

Sprig 2011]

HIV-Related Aggravated Assaults

A. The Biting Cases....................
B. The Sex Cases..................................582
V. Canada's Use of its Criminal Law...........
VI. Conclusions and Implications. ........................

551
............. 574
............ 595
600

INTRODUCTION

"Birds can fly" and "the number thirteen follows the number twelve"
seem like truisms, statements as irrefutable as "the sky is blue." Of
course, some birds cannot fly, thirteen does not follow twelve on a clock
and the sky is rarely, if ever, just blue. These so-called truths are just
"rules-of-thumb," shorthand generalizations or easy-to-recall heuristics
meant to simplify a complicated world. While rules-of-thumb may be
useful in daily life,' they can be problematic bases for legal conclusions.
General rules-of-thumb, however, are precisely what certain states
and the United States military use to convict HIV 2-positive individuals
of attempting to spread the virus. Many jurisdictions use the traditional
criminal law-specifically, the crime of aggravated assault-to
criminalize HIV exposure. Other states have created a separate crime of
intentional HIV exposure, 3 passed statutes that enhance criminal
* Teaching Fellow, California Western School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School; A.B., magna cum laude, Harvard College. The author would like to
thank Professors Art Campbell, Scott Ehrlich, Floralynn Einesman, Jessica Fink
and Tim Casey for their insightful and helpful comments both on the draft and
at a presentation of this paper before the faculty at California Western School of
Law.
There are countless "rules-of-thumb" books counseling readers how to survive
this or that life obstacle, including, JAY SILVERMAN ET AL., RULES OF THUMB: A
GUIDE FOR WRITERS (8th ed. 2009) and ALAN WEBBER, RULES OF THUMB:
TRUTHS FOR WINNING AT BUSINESS WITHOUT LOSING YOUR SELF (2009).
2 HIV,
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the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, is the virus that causes AIDS, the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. See R.A. Weiss, How Does HIV
Cause AIDS?, 260 SCIENCE 1273 (1993); Daniel C. Douek et al., Emerging
Concepts in the Immunopathogenesis ofAIDS, 60 ANN. REV. MED. 471 (2009).
3 As of 2010, twenty states have HIV-specific statutes that criminalize the
knowing or intentional exposure of others to HIV in certain contexts. See ARK.
CODE. ANN. § 5-14-123 (West 2010); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291
(West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-560(c)-(d) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/12-16.2 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1 (West 2011); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (2010) (proscribing intentionally exposing another
to the "AIDS virus" without knowing and lawful consent); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.5210 (West 2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2010); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 201.205 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5 (West
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2903.11(B), 2921.38(C), 2927.13 (LexisNexis 20011) (criminalizing certain
behavior by those with the "virus that causes" AIDS); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
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penalties when someone who is HIV-positive commits a crime, or
applied general sexually transmitted infection statutes to HIV exposure.
Numerous scholars have traced the development of these criminal laws,
analyzed their effectiveness, and detailed doctrinal issues plaguing these
statutes, such as overbreadth, vagueness and practical difficulties of
6
proving intent. And yet, while this scholarship has ably debated the
advantages and disadvantages of these various strategies from afar, it has
failed to address certain details. In particular, I argue that HIV-positive
defendants charged with aggravated assault for risking transmission of
HIV are victims of rules-of-thumb: instead of requiring the State to
prove that the defendant on trial acted in a manner "likely" to cause
substantial harm or death-a necessary element of aggravated assaultsome courts rely on the generalized rule of thumb that unprotected sex
transmits HIV. At issue in aggravated assault prosecutions is likelihood,
and the likelihood of transmission varies from one HIV-positive
individual to another. This Article identifies how courts use rules-ofthumb in HIV-related aggravated assault cases and, as a result, argues
that the courts run afoul of logic and due process when these cases
involve a factually unique defendant.
While my argument is founded upon a respect for the principle that
the State must prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt before securing a conviction, it may be misinterpreted to suggest
that I am defending the behavior of those who intentionally try to
transmit HIV. That is not the case. Cases like that of Philippe Padieu,
who intentionally tried to infect six women with HIV, and Nushawn

§ 1192.1 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-13-109, 68-32-104 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-67.4:1, 32.1-289.2
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.011 (West 2011).
4In some states, committing a sexual crime while infected with HIV can
enhance the penalty for that crime. Colorado, for example, imposes "a

mandatory term of incarceration of at least three times the upper limit of the
presumptive range for the level of offense committed, up to the remainder of the

person's natural life," for those HIV-positive individuals convicted of a sexual
offense that involved penetration of any kind. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3415.5, 18-7-205.7 (West 2010).
5 See ALA. CODE § 22-1 A-21 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (2010);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (Consol. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-1
(2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5424 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 16-4-20
(LexisNexis 2011).
6 See, e.g., Leslie Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment: Is There a
Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821
(2004); Amy McGuire, Comment, AIDS as a Weapon: CriminalProsecution of
HIV Exposure, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1787 (1999). For an early discussion of how
criminalization began, see Marvin E. Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is
Being Criminalized,3 CRIM. JUST. 6, 6-8 (1988).
7Diane Jennings, Man Who SpreadHIV Gets 45 Years, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
May 30, 2009, at IB.
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Williams, who is alleged to have exposed between 48 and 123 women to
HIV, stir a natural emotional and punitive response. Such anger has led
to the implementation of countless criminal transmission of HIV
statutes 9 and laws that punish HIV-positive individuals who intentionally
spread the disease or have unprotected sex without informing partners.'o
The relative value of these laws has been discussed by othersI and is,
therefore, not my focus. But, the outcry for criminalization has caused
overreach. It is the product of a longstanding stigma associated with the
HIV-positive population, in general.12 That stigma is nondiscriminatory
-it attaches to the Nushawn Williamses of the world just as it attaches
to those who have no intent to harm anyone. We have seen cases where
prosecutors were allowed to prove intent to kill or do harm merely by
proving that the defendant had unprotected sex while aware of his HIVpositive status, even when the statute calls for more than mere
knowledge of status.' 3 And, we have seen aggravated assault
Lynda Richardson, Man Faces Felony Charge of Exposing Girl to HIV, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at B3. For a detailed summary of Mr. Williams's story,
see Wolf & Vezina, supra note 6, at 821-25. Williams is thought to have
exposed forty women in Jamestown, N.Y., and between fifty and seventy-five
women in New York City. Id. at 524.
9 See ALA. CODE § 22-1 lA-21 (2011); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291
(West 1996 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-415.5, 18-7-205.7
(West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-60 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (1998 & Supp.
2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-16.2 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709C.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5424 (2011); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.5 (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210 (West 2001); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18113 (2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (Consol. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-11-1 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 16-4-20 (2011). Numerous commentators have
argued that such laws were passed in haste for political expedience. "HIVspecific statutes have been passed most often as political measures to calm the

fears of the populace at the beginning of the epidemic. The hastiness of the
drafting of these statutes makes them less than ideal." Thomas W. Tierney,
Comment, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV: An International
Analysis, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 475, 511 (1992). "[P]olitical
pressures on legislators to use the coercive powers of the state to combat the
[AIDS] epidemic are unmistakable." Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health
Strategiesfor ConfrontingAIDS, 261 JAMA 1621, 1629 (1989).
'0 See Wolf & Vezina, supra note 6, at 844-69.

" See, e.g., id.; James B. McArthur, As the Tide Turns: The Changing
HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalizationof HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 707 (2009).

Michael L. Closen, The Decade ofSupreme Court Avoidance ofAIDS: Denial
of Certiorariin HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61
ALB. L. REV. 897 (1998).
1 See, e.g., State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 741-50 (Iowa 2006). The court
found that Mr. Musser possessed intent to harm merely because he engaged in
sex, regardless of his belief that he could or could not cause harm. Id. The
12
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prosecutions of HIV-positive individuals who had a good faith belief that
they could not transmit the disease, had used protection, and had no
intent to harm.14 While the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
should apply to even the worst actors, it is particularly troubling that
HIV-positive defendants who never intended harm, have been convicted
of serious charges without sufficient evidence.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the latest data and
understanding of HIV transmission as it relates to determining different
HIV-positive individuals' risk of transmission of the disease. This Part
identifies heterogeneity with respect to risk of transmission within the
HIV-positive population. Part II argues that applying a general rule to a
heterogeneous population could result in committing the logical Fallacy
of Accident. This Part defines the Fallacy and provides examples in other
areas of law. Part III identifies how the Accident Fallacy can victimize
certain unique defendants in HIV-related aggravated assaults and
discusses how each step in the Accident Fallacy represents a due process
violation-the use of generalized proof to prove an element of the crime
and the correlative lowering of the government's burden. Part IV finds
evidence of these errors in numerous jurisdictions' attempts to use the
criminal law to punish the transmission of HIV. This Part also discusses
the special case of the military's jurisprudence in this area and identifies
two errors in that jurisprudence. 5 Part V looks to Canada's use of its
common law as a model for avoiding this logical and constitutional error
in the future. Part VI identifies the implications of these errors,
cautioning those jurisdictions that remain committed to using the
traditional criminal law in this area.

limited proof of intent necessary to convict HIV-positive individuals is striking,
but not the discrete subject of this Article. For a discussion of intent and other
considerations where the traditional criminal law is used to punish the
transmission of HIV, see Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha Field, AIDS and the
Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 162-72 (1988).
E.g., United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
The military criminal justice system is a parallel system of justice created
pursuant to the President's executive powers. General courts-martial, the trial
courts in the military, are subject to appellate review by the Courts of Criminal
Appeal (CCA) of each service (though the Navy and Marine Corp. are covered
by one CCA) and the United States Court of Appeal for the Armed Forces
(C.A.A.F.), the highest civilian court in the military. C.A.A.F. is an Article I
court, with worldwide jurisdiction concurrent with the jurisdiction of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the military's governing criminal
and jurisdictional code. See CHARLES A. SHANOR & L. LYNN HOGUE,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 231-310 (2003) for
an introduction to the military criminal system. Where possible and for ease of
understanding, terminology unique to military criminal practice has been
replaced with civilian criminal practice language.
14

15

Spring 2011 ]
I.

HIV-Related AggravatedAssaults

555

THE SCIENCE OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF TRANSMITTING HIV

Every year researchers discover more data on the spread,
progression and treatment of HIV, yet for reasons we can only speculate
about, the means of HIV transmission is still the subject of rumor,
hearsay and fear. In 1999, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) published a fact sheet that stated, in relevant part, that
"HIV is spread by sexual contact with an infected person."1 6 That may
be true, but it provides no real guidance. It ignores the significant
difference in risk between oral and vaginal intercourse, and ignores the
fact that "sexual contact" that does not involve exchanging blood, semen
or vaginal fluid poses little to no risk of HIV transmission.17 It may be
the CDC's evident gloss over the specifics of transmission that causes
some to equate the general statement that "HIV is spread by sexual
contact" with an absolute truth of universal applicability when it comes
to risk of transmission, but despite the CDC's generalizations, we know
much about how and when HIV will spread. Through a series of simple
tests and treatments, physicians can distinguish between HIV-positive
individuals whose likelihood of transmission of the disease differ
markedly.'8
The HIV-positive community is fungible only so far as it is classified
as a community distinct from the HIV-negative community. In that
regard, HIV is like pregnancy: the status of being pregnant is binary in
that a woman is either pregnant or not pregnant and clinicians have tests
to determine both pregnancy and HIV status with accuracy.19 But once
16

CDC, HIV AND TRANSMISSION 1 (July 1999), availableat http://img.thebody.

com/cdc/pdfs/transmission.pdf.
17 See Alix R. Rubin, Comment, HIV Positive, Employment Negative? HIV
DiscriminationAmong Health Care Workers in the United States and France,
17 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 398, 404 (1996).
18

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss HIV in general. For a

comprehensive medical analysis, see ROBERT L. MURPHY ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT OF HIV/AIDS INFECTIONS 14-

17 (3d ed. 2009).
19 One of those tests, two-site immunoradiometric assay (IRMA), can detect
exceedingly low levels of the placenta-secreted hormone human chorionic
gonadotropin (HCG) in a woman's blood. A second type of assay, an enzymelinked immusorbent assay (ELISA), can be used to detect the presence of HIV
antibodies. See, e.g., E. G. Armstrong et al., Use of a Highly Sensitive and
Specific Immunoradiometric Assay for Detection of Human Chorionic
Gonadotropinin Urine ofNormal, Nonpregnant and PregnantIndividuals, 59 J.
CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 867, 867-74 (1984) (using an

IRMA to detect the presence of HCG in pregnant and nonpregnant women);
CECIL MEDICINE

§ XXIV 2557-60 (L. Goldman & D. Ausiello eds., 2007)

(using an ELISA to detect the presence of HIV antibodies); Joon-Sup Yeom,
Evaluation of a New Third-Generation ELISA for the Detection of HIV
Infection, 36 ANNALS CLINICAL & LABORATORY SC. 73, 73-78 (2006) (using
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an individual is HIV-positive, his or her particular condition-its
gestation, physical manifestation, susceptibility to infection, and risk of
transmission, to name just a few factors-takes a unique track that
requires more narrowly tailored classifications.
Just like there are stages of pregnancy, there are stages of HIV which
include a gestation period where antibodies are not present in bodily
fluids.20 There are, in fact, at least four stages of HIV: (1) acute or
primary infection, (2) clinically asymptomatic, (3) symptomatic, and (4)
progression from HIV to AIDS. 2 1 Those stages can be further subdivided
based on particular symptoms or lack thereof. For example, one who is
classified in the clinically asymptomatic second stage may be entirely
asymptomatic or experience various minor symptoms. 2 2 Furthermore,
many HIV-positive individuals in all of these categories are prescribed a
the LG Anti-HIV 1/2 Plus ELISA, a new third-generation diagnostic assay for
detecting HIV infection).
20 Miguel Goicoechea, M.D., Presentation at University of California, San
Diego: Antivirals for Starters, at 6 (Jan. 2009) (showing a common progression
of an average CD4 cell count in an untreated HIV-positive individual).

CD4 Cell Count Natural History of
Untreated HIV-1 Infection
100

nfection
Earty Opportunistic

CD4.

Cells40Lste

Opportunlstic Infections

201
13
( 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Infection

14

Tim InYears

MURPHY, supra note 18, at 14-17.
The Different Stages of HIV Infection, http://www.avert.org/stages-hivaids.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). Also, within any stage, the individual's
viral load will vary. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(CDC), MMWR REc. & REP. 41(RR-17), 1993 REVISED CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM FOR HIV INFECTION AND EXPANDED SURVEILLANCE CASE DEFINITION
FOR AIDS AMONG ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS (Dec. 18, 1992), availableat
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00018871.htm; CDC, MMWR REC.
& REP. 48(RR-13), GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
21
22

VIRUS

CASE

SURVEILLANCE,

INCLUDING

MONITORING

FOR

HUMAN

IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS INFECTION AND ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY
SYNDROME (Dec. 9, 1999), availableat www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrht
ml/rr4813al.htm; World Health Organization, WHO Case Definitions of HIV

for Surveillance and Revised ClinicalStaging and Immunological Classification
ofHIV-Related Disease in Adults and Children, www.who.int/hiv/pub/guideline
s/HIVstagingl503O7.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
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series of medications to help manage symptoms and to attempt to put the
disease into remission. There are two major medical factors that speak
directly to the likelihood that a given HIV-positive individual's actions
could transmit the virus: first, the amount of virus in the individual's
blood and his body's immunological response, and second, the nature
and effectiveness of his particular therapy.
A.

VIRAL LOAD AND T-CELL COUNT

There are two commonly used tests that track HIV progression. The
CD4+ cell count, more commonly known as the T-cell count, has
traditionally been the best marker. CD4 t tests measure the number of Tcells containing the CD4+ receptor. It is this CD4+ cell, or lymphocyte,
that HIV progressively destroys. 23 Therefore, the lower the CD4+ count,
the further the disease has progressed and the worse the patient's
symptoms are. The T-cell count does not check the presence of HIV, but
rather assess the patient's immune system response. When a CD44 count
reaches a new low point, 24 i.e., when a patient's white cell count has
fallen to a point where it is harder to fight infection, the patient may have
progressed to a different stage of the disease or may require more
aggressive treatment therapies. 25 On the other hand, HIV-positive
persons who are able to keep viral replication at low levels and maintain
high CD4+ T-cell counts over a prolonged period of time are considered
"long-term nonprogressors."26 Approximately two to five percent of the
HIV-positive population meets this definition.27 Because they maintain
high CD4+ cell counts over many years, long-term nonprogressors
deviate from the hypothetical average HIV-positive individual, whose
CD4+ cell count drops upon infection, increases shortly thereafter and
then begins a mostly gradual decline.28 Treatment, risks, and prognoses
are all influenced by CD4+ cell count, which can range from a low CD4+
cell count for symptomatic HIV-positive individuals to a high cell count
for long-term nonprogressors.2 9
23 THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION

927 (Robert Berkow et al.

eds., 1997).
24 A common threshold is 350 cells per microliter. When a patient has less than
200 cells per microliter, he or she has progressed to AIDS. See Maria G. Essig,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection, REVOLUTION HEALTH (May 8,

2008), http://www.revolutionhealth.com/conditions/hiv-aids/hiv-aids/overview.
25 CD4 Cell Tests, THEBODY.COM, http://www.thebody.com/content/art6110.ht

ml (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).

26 MURPHY, supra note 18, at 13.
27 Id.

28 See Goicoechea,supra note 20.

29 According to Dr. Miguel Goicoechea of the University of California, San
Diego, HIV-positive individuals fall into at least four categories with respect to
their CD4+ cell count and its implications for treatment. If a patient is
symptomatic, treatment is indicated regardless of his CD4+ cell count. If a
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The other type of HIV marker tracks the virus's viral count. In an
HIV-positive person, the immune system and the virus exist in a balance.
The T-cell count marks the immune system while a viral RNA count
marks the virus itself.30 A viral load test measures the amount of a virus
3
present in the blood by measuring the amount of HIV-specific RNA. 1
This is a more accurate, direct way to measure the virus. Studies have
shown that HIV viral RNA levels are highly correlated with response to
therapy and can predict progression to AIDS. 32 They also can assess the
extent to which the HIV virus poses a risk to the patient and his or her
sexual partners: the lower a patient's viral load, the healthier the patient,
the lower the chance of progression from HIV to AIDS, and the lower
33
the probability of transmission.
For example, a low viral load is usually between 40 to 500
copies/mL.34 This result usually indicates that HIV is not actively
reproducing and that the risk of disease progression and transmission is
low. Patients with low viral loads who adhere to their antiretroviral
therapies have been shown to reduce their viral loads further, slow
disease progression, and lower the risk of transmission through sexual
intercourse. One study even determined that such patients could never
transmit the disease, but those conditions have yet to be replicated.
patient is asymptomatic, but with a CD4+ cell count below 200 cells per
microliter, treatment is indicated. If a patient is asymptomatic, with a CD4 cell
count between 201 and 350 cells per microliter, treatment should be offered to
the patient. Finally, if a patient is asymptomatic and has a CD4+ cell count
above 350 cells per microliter, the need for treatment should be determined on a
case-by-case basis based on a variety of individual circumstances. Goicoechea,
supra note 20, at 9.
30 Viral RNA molecules are "actually tiny pieces of the virus's genetic material,
and viral load tests count the number of these RNA pieces." William B. Paxton,
UnderstandingHIV-1 Viral Load, VIRAL LOAD (Mar. 20, 2011, 11:30 AM),
http://www.reocities.com/HotSprings/1290Nirload.html.
3' Murphy, supra note 18, at 13.
32
id.
33 Susanna Atia et al., Sexual Transmission ofHIV According to Viral Load and
Antiretroviral Therapy: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 23 AIDS 1397,

1401-02 (2009), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/events/artprevention/attia
sexual.pdf.
34
HIV Viral Load, LABTESTSONLINE, http://www.labtestsonline.org/understand
ing/analytes/viralload/test.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
3 See P. Vemazza et al., Les Personnes Siropositives ne Souffrant D'aucune
Autre MST et Suivant un Traitment AntiritroviralEfficace ne Transmettent Pas
le VIH ParAoie Sexuelle, 89(5) BULLETIN DES MIDECINS SUISSES 165 (2008)

(Switz.), available at http://www.saez.ch/pdf f/2008/2008-05/2008-05-089.pdf,
Swiss HIV Experts Claim HIV Patients with Undetectable HIV Who Adhere to
Treatment Regimens Cannot Transmit the Virus to Their HIV Negative

Partners, http://www.hivandhepatitis.com/recent/2008/020508_a.html
visited Oct. 1, 2010).

(last
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Viral load tests can also indicate an "undetectable" viral load, i.e.,
lower than 40 copies/mL.36 Long-term nonprogressors usually have
undetectable levels of HIV RNA for much of their lives, but any HIVpositive individual's viral load can drop to undetectable levels for shorter
periods. 37 The drops usually coincide with effective treatments and the
spikes usually coincide with patient failures to follow protocol or a
disease mutation that reduces the effectiveness of an old treatment.38 In
either case, while an undetectable viral load does not mean that the
patient is cured, it may mean that either the HIV RNA is not present in
his or her blood or that the level of HIV RNA is below the threshold
needed for detection. Studies indicate that the risk of transmission varies
directly with the viral load at all levels. 3 9 The test is cheap, available,
highly sensitive, and can efficiently distinguish among HIV-positive
individuals as to the likelihood that their actions could transmit the
disease.
B.

TREATMENT

There are various drugs currently available that tend to impede the
progression of HIV, reduce and ameliorate symptoms and improve a
patient's immunoresponse. 4 0 The most effective treatment is a cocktail of
drugs known together as Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy
(HAART). HAART is the combination of at least three antiretroviral
drugs that attack different parts of HIV or stop the virus from entering
blood cells, and it has been shown to modulate an HIV-positive patient's
immune system and even reduce his viral load to undetectable levels. 4 1
But, HAART is not a cure.42 Physicians advise all HIV-positive patients
that there is no cure and even if treatments eliminate all symptoms, the

36 David P. Wilson et al., Relation Between HIV Viral Load and Infectiousness:
A Model-BasedAnalysis, 372 LANCET 314 (2008).
37 MURPHY, supra note 18, at 20.
38 See R.A. DeMasi et al., Correlation Between Self-Reported Adherence to
Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) and Virologic Outcome, 18
ADVANCES THERAPY 163, 163-73 (July-Aug. 2001).
39 Atia, supra note 33, at 1401-02.
40 See HIV and Its Treatment-Approved Medications to Treat HIV, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/Appro

vedMedstoTreatHIV_FS en.pdf.
41 J.S. Montaner et al., Association of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy

Coverage, Population Viral Load, and Yearly New HIV Diagnoses in British
Columbia, Canada: A Population-BasedStudy, 376 LANCET 532, 532-39

(Aug. 2010).
42 Researchers are actively looking for a cure. In 2010, new studies moved us
ever closer to a cure or a vaccine. See, e.g., Daniel J. DeNoon, Discovery May
Pave Way to AIDS Vaccine, WEBMD (July 9, 2010), http://www.webmd.com/hi
v-aids/news/20100709/antibodies-discovery-may-pave-way-to-aids-vaccine.
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virus is likely still present somewhere in the body.43 HAART does not
work for everyone and, in fact, there appears to be no clear indication
when one cocktail will work, if it will continue to work or which
alternate combination would work better." Nevertheless, studies have
shown that the combination of effective HAART and low viral loads has
effectively neutralized HIV's ability both to replicate inside the patient's
blood and to be transmitted through his bodily fluids to another.4 5
The HIV-positive population, then, is varied with respect to each
individual's risk of transmission. For example, there are those who
remain asymptomatic and whose conditions never progress, those who
experience symptoms for five years and then none for fifty, and those
whose only symptom is fatigue. It is rare that these HIV-positive
individuals can transmit the virus, even with unprotected sex. And, the
scientific and medical tools to identify this heterogeneity or, more
specifically, to identify deviations from the average, are readily
available.
The risk of transmission is of paramount legal significance. HIV
status often becomes an issue at trial specifically because an HIVpositive defendant committed an act that risked the transmission of the
virus.46 The elements of the crime of aggravated assault, for example,
make this clear. The crime is incumbent upon the likelihood of harm
through a particular means, not the harm itself. The victim's HIV status
after the interaction is irrelevant to the prosecution's case. Rather, the
likelihood that the defendant could have caused harm is pertinent, and
this likelihood varies with a defendant's viral load. Since a viral load test
is readily available, there is no need to rely on a general rule of thumb
about transmission through bodily fluids. The viral load test, as well as
the T-cell count before it, not to mention an effective HAART regimen,
can distinguish among the heterogeneous HIV population and find the
exceptional cases to which the general rule does not apply.
43 M. Dybul et al., Guidelines for Using Antiretroviral Agents Among HIV-

Infected Adults and Adolescents, 137

ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

381 (Sept.

2002).
44 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 16.
45 Atia, supra note 33, at 1401-02.

See ALA. CODE § 22-l1 A-21 (2011); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291
(West 1996 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-415.5, 18-7-205.7
(West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-60 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (1998 & Supp.
2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-16.2 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709C.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5424 (2011); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.5 (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210 (West 2001); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18113 (2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (Consol. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-11-1 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 16-4-20 (2011); see, e.g., McGuire, supra note

46

6; Schechter, supra note 6, at 6-8; Wolf & Vezina, supra note 6.
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Despite the ability to single out those with exceedingly low risk of
transmission, jurisdictions that use the traditional criminal law to
criminalize the possible transmission of HIV tend to rely on generalized
evidence that refers to the average HIV-positive individual. Some simply
rely upon a general rule of thumb that all the State needs to do to satisfy
the likelihood of transmission prong of aggravated assault is to introduce
into evidence the CDC's fact sheet that states that "HIV is spread by
sexual contact." Even where the rule of thumb happens to apply to the
particular defendant on trial, principles of due process suggest that such
generalized information should not fulfill the State's obligation to prove
that the defendant on trial, as opposed to the HIV-positive population as
a whole, committed the charged crime. Other courts will even apply the
rule of thumb to a case they know is unique-one in which the defendant
is a long-term nonprogressor. In these jurisdictions, it does not matter
that the likelihood of transmission was infinitesimally small because
"likelihood" has been interpreted to mean mere "possibility." This makes
the unique circumstances of the defendant's situation irrelevant. In other
words, these courts commit the Fallacy of Accident.
II. THE ACCIDENT FALLACY

The Accident Fallacy occurs when a general rule is applied to a
specific situation in which the rule-because of unique individual facts,
or "accidents"-is inapplicable. The mistake occurs when the general
rule is applied inappropriately so it misses salient differences in a
heterogeneous population and fails to recognize exceptions where they
should exist or when a rule of thumb is used to come to over-inclusive
conclusions. It has two steps: (1) generalize about a population, and (2)
incorrectly use that generalization to describe a unique subset of that
population.47 For example, the statement "birds can fly" may be true, but
it is not always true. There are exceptions: flightless birds, injured birds,
or birds whose feet are stuck in gum. 48 Because of these observable
47

See

S. MORRIS

ENGEL, WITH GOOD REASON:

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

INFORMAL FALLACIES 104-111 (6th ed. 1999) (discussing the Fallacy of Hasty

Generalizations, also known as the Accident Fallacy).
48 That "birds can fly" has any number of categorical exceptions, like penguins
and other flightless birds-ostrich, emu, cassowary, rhea, kiwi, and Inaccessible
Island rail are the six other non-extinct flightless birds-and conditional
exceptions, like birds with broken wings, or birds with feet stuck in gum or
birds that have suddenly developed aviophobia. Therefore, to look at any given
bird and assume that it can fly would be a valid use of a rule of thumb heuristic,
but it would not necessarily be an accurate assessment of that bird's ability. Nor
would it be fair to an injured bird, whose reparable infirmity would be ignored if
observed by an obtuse generalizer. The same is true of the number example. The
numeral 13 does follow the numeral 12 in sequential counting in base-10 math,
but not on 12-hour clocks, in elevators in many American hotels, or in airplanes.
See, e.g., Barbara De Lollis, Some Hotels Don't Skip the 13th Floor Anymore,
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exceptions, flight is not the determinative factor for classifying animals
as birds. For example, Galapagos penguins are entitled to the same legal
protections due other endangered birds, regardless of their ability to fly.49
Rules-of-thumb, then, can be useful shorthand descriptors only when
ignoring distinctions or denying heterogeneity in a population is
acceptable.
Plato realized this Fallacy when he identified valid exceptions to
general rules.50 In The Republic, he states that one should pay one's
debts, except when the circumstances are such that paying the debt
would be a uniquely bad thing: "Suppose that a friend when in his right
mind has deposited weapons with me and he asks for them when he is
not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him?",5 The general
rule is not wrong per se, but rather inappropriately applied when used to
describe a particular case that is unique, whether those unique conditions
are unknown, rare, or obscure. Some Accident Fallacies are jokes
("white men can't jump"), others are negative stereotypes ("gay men are
superficial"). In either case, the Fallacy is a problematic tool for legal
reasoning.
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa5 is a good example of the
Accident Fallacy at work in the law. In that case, residents of an
unincorporated section on the outskirts of town sought city voting rights,
arguing that they had long been subjected to city obligations, but enjoyed
They defined voting rights as
none of the correlative rights.
concomitant with the imposition of police and sanitary regulations,
criminal court jurisdiction, and the city's professional licensing power.
The Supreme Court denied the requested relief, stating that it was
impossible to restrict the influence of a city's actions,5 4 but it was
entirely rational for a state to delineate geographic boundaries for the
purposes of voting and to deny voting rights to those living outside those
USA TODAY (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/200703-08-13th-floor-usat N.htm.
49 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service lists the Galapagos penguin as
endangered, which means it is in danger of extinction within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., Galapagos Penguin (Spheniscus mendiculus) (Mar. 2, 2011), http://ecos.
fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=BO2M.
50 IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 95-96 (5th ed. 1978).
5'
52

Id.
439 U.S. 60 (1978).

Id. at 62, 69.
54 Id. at 69 ("The imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral

the influence of municipal actions. A city's decisions inescapably affect
individuals living immediately outside its borders. The granting of building
permits for high rise apartments, industrial plants, and the like on the city's
fringe unavoidably contributes to problems of traffic congestion, school
districting, and law enforcement immediately outside the city.").
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boundaries. 5 In so holding, the Court's reasoning was opportunistic. For
the purposes of explaining a city's extraterritorial reach, the city's
boundary line was "imaginary." For the purposes of establishing voting
rights, the boundary was a physical or "geographic" one that defined
"the government entity."5 6 This was a logical fallacy. As Justice Brennan
noted in his dissent, it may be true that the Court had previously based
the extension of city franchise on geographical residency in other cases,
but the application of that general rule made no sense in this case. Never
before had the Court been faced with a situation in which an
unincorporated community, just outside of a city's technical border, had
been denied voting rights but was subject to the city's police, sanitary,
and licensing powers. 57 The "accidents" of this case-the unique and
well-established relationship between the city and this communitymade the application of the general rule unsound.
Courts face such unique situations almost every time a party asks
that an exception to a general rule be carved out and, almost as often,
they do not commit the Accident Fallacy. The plain error doctrine
illustrates this point well. Generally, "a contemporaneous objection to
jury instructions must be made at trial." 58 The plain error doctrine,
however, recognizes that some errors, regardless of the quality of
defense counsel or a strategic decision not to object, are so abhorrent to
principles of justice that the general rule must be put aside.59 This
exception permits an appellate court to remand for a new trial where
both "a highly prejudicial error affect[ed] substantial rights,"6 o and a
miscarriage of justice has occurred or where the court must "preserve the
integrity and the reputation of the judicial process."6 Where the defense
failed to object to a judge's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense, for
example, the very centrality of that element to the defense's case and the
5
1

56

Id. at 66-68.

Id. at 68-69.
57 Id. at 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The criterion of geographical residency is
thus entirely arbitrary when applied to this case. [The Court] fails to explain
why, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, the 'government unit'
which may exclude from the franchise those who reside outside of its
geographical boundaries should be composed of the city of Tuscaloosa rather
than of the city together with its police jurisdiction. It irrationally distinguishes
between two classes of citizens, each with equal claim to residency (insofar as
that can be determined by domicile or intention or other similar criteria), and
each governed by the city of Tuscaloosa in the place of their residency.").
58 Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677 (3rd Cir. 1991).
5 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (defining plain error as used in criminal cases
where the rule protects against defects that affect a defendant's substantial
rights).
60 United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th
Cir. 1979).
61 United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
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resulting gravamen of the judge's error may amount to plain error and
may warrant a new trial.62
The plain error doctrine can exist because of the ability to
distinguish between harmless errors, plain errors," and errors which
are not errors at all. 65 Trial level errors are, therefore, heterogeneous and
universal thus application of a general rule would be inappropriate.
Where heterogeneity makes it possible to distinguish among members of
a group-like birds, legal errors, and HIV-positive criminal
defendants-reasoning from general rules can result in specious,
illogical, and unjust conclusions.
It should already be evident how this Fallacy applies to certain
defendants in HIV-positive aggravated assaults. The general rule that
HIV is spread through sexual contact with an infected person may be
true, but it fails to account for infected persons who, by virtue of their
low viral loads and highly effective HAART regimes, have been found
to be virtually unable to transmit HIV during sexual contact. Admittedly,
"virtually unable" and "unable" are two different things. To be
absolutely certain that someone cannot transmit the disease would
require a cure, without which, there is always some possibility of
transmission. However, the fact that something is medically possible is
not sufficient in a legal sense. Aggravated assault requires a means likely
to cause substantial harm or death. A prosecutor should not be able to use
evidence of a statistically insignificant possibility in order to prove
likelihood.
III. LOGICAL "ACCIDENT" AS A DUE PROCESS PROBLEM

The Accident Fallacy also raises due process concerns. Implicit in
the concept of due process is the requirement that the State prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the particular defendant on trial committed the
charged crime.66 To do so, prosecutors must prove every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Consider two hypothetical proffers
of proof for two different crimes: It would be sufficient to prove intent to
Virgin Islands, 949 F.2d at 683.
See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (stating that harmless
error review presumptively applies to all errors where objection is made); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (holding that the
presence of alternates in jury room not plain error).
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 244-45 (2008) (finding no
error where magistrate judge presides over voir dire).
66 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due
62
63

Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.").
" Id. at 361-64.
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cause serious bodily injury if a defendant slashed at his victim with a
pocket knife and repeatedly punched his victim's head. 68 However,
recourse to the dubious assumption that all socialists want to overthrow
the government would be insufficient to prove that a defendant who
attended a Socialist Party-sponsored pro-labor rally was guilty of
plotting to overthrow the government for two reasons. First, some
socialists may want to overthrow the government, but many would
prefer to work within the system and change our social priorities to meet
their preferences. 69 So, to convict a defendant of plotting to overthrow
the government based on a general (and ill-informed) rule would ignore
those exceptions. Second, the generalized assumption does not prove
that the defendant's conduct met any element of the crime of plotting to
overthrow the government, thus accepting the generalized assumption
relieves the State of its burden of proving that the defendant is actually
guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
There are, in fact, two due process problems in many HIV-related
aggravated assault cases. One concerns what the State must prove and
the other concerns how the state must prove it. The first problem arose
when the State's burden became only to prove mere "possibility" rather
than "likelihood" absent any instruction from the legislature. This
"Anything is Possible" standard raises due process concerns. Defendants
in these cases almost universally concede any arguments on intent and
the foundational question of whether HIV qualifies as an instrument of
harm. The only element that remains for the prosecution to prove is a
question of likelihood of harm vis-d-vis the manner of use and of harm.
To permit conviction under a theory of mere possibility is to redefine the
likelihood requirement.
The second due process error is in the manner in which the State
proves likelihood. In re Winship requires the State to prove that the
defendant's conduct meets each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.7 0 This necessarily forces the State to distinguish
between the defendant and any class of persons to which he belongs
because generalizations as to the behavior of that class cannot logically
speak to the allegedly culpable behavior of one of its members-unless
membership in that class is based upon pertinent individual
characteristics. This "Impersonal Guilt" theory stereotypes an entire
class and, therefore, cannot establish criminal culpability.

Commonwealth v. Pandolfo, 446 A.2d 939 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
See, e.g., Sen. Bernard Sanders, Sanders Socialist Success, Bernie Sanders,
UNITED STATES SENATE (Mar. 1, 2011, 4:30 PM) http://sanders.senate.gov/new
sroom/news/?id=7b6eba9b-67f5-4d8f-bc75-ce63a07035d2 (Sen. Sanders, an
Independent from Vermont, identifies himself as a Socialist.).
'o 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68
69
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"ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE" ASA LEGAL STANDARD

The principle that one can only be convicted of a crime if every
element of that crime is proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" has always
been a part of the bedrock of the criminal law, which, as Justice Brennan
explained, was likely why the Court had never been so explicit before In
re Winship.71 The Court explicitly laid out this principle in Winship72 and
emphasized various rationales, including the need to balance the gravity
of a criminal conviction against the possibility of fact-finding error.
Justice Brennan noted that what is at stake in any criminal trial is the
defendant's "transcend[ent]" interest in his liberty, and, given the nature
of that interest, the reasonable doubt standard ensures that his liberty is
not taken away because of a mere mistake.7 3 But when the burden of
persuasion is lowered to the point where a scintilla of evidence would be
sufficient, a court would allow convictions despite errors of fact and
logic. It would obviate the need for a reasonable doubt standard: there
can be no reasonable doubt of anything since anything is possible.
Consider the opposite context-namely, what constitutes reasonable
doubt. It seems clear that "anything is possible" has never been a
reasonable doubt. Judge Posner, in affirming a conviction for an
accountant who thought that embezzled funds were tax exempt, found
that while it is possible for an experienced accountant to be so willfully
71 Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissent in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)

came close. Leland upheld a state law requiring defendants to prove insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 799. Justice Frankfurter believed that the
reasonable doubt standard, which imposed an obligation on the state to prove
guilt, was inconsistent with that approach. Id. at 802-03 ("[F]rom the time that
the law which we have inherited has emerged from dark and barbaric times, the
conception of justice which has dominated our criminal law has refused to put
an accused at the hazard of punishment if he fails to remove every reasonable
doubt of his innocence in the minds of jurors. It is the duty of the Government
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (Frankfurther, J., dissenting).
72 The Harvard Law Review Ass'n., Note, Winship on Rough Waters: The
Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1093, 1093-95
(1992-93). The Note points to three rationales: (1) bringing meaning to the
presumption of innocence, (2) embodying the moral weight we give to
erroneous convictions, and (3) leveling the playing field between a defendant

and the government. A fourth rationale is highlighted in Justice Brennan's
majority opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence-namely, the appreciation of
the gravity of a criminal conviction.
73 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 372 ("There is always in litigation a margin of
error, representing an error in factfinding, which both parties must take into
account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a
criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party the burden of. . . persuading the factfinder
... of his. guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958))).
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obtuse, the possibility was too remote and implausible.74 After all,
"[a]nything is possible; there are no metaphysical certainties accessible
to human reason; but a merely metaphysical doubt . . . is not a

reasonable doubt for the purposes of the criminal law."75 This principle
does not only exclude the fanciful ("it is possible that I will burst into
flames"), but also the realistic, yet remote. In a case involving the
unlawful selling of a motor vehicle inspection sticker, testimony of a
forgetful witness at trial left open the possibility that the defendant did
not sell the sticker even though direct evidence showed the defendant
had the sticker in his custody from the beginning.7 6 The possibility was
too remote for acquittal: "It is possible to have doubts that are not
reasonable."n
If mere possibility cannot survive as a reasonable doubt, it cannot
survive as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. After all, there can be no
reasonable doubt that anything is possible. And, "anything is possible"
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny as a basis for criminal conviction.
That makes logical sense. The statement that "anyone could have
grabbed the gun from me in the dark before the gun went off' 78 is neither
a reason to exclude anyone as a suspect nor a reason to charge everyone
else with the crime. If it were, everyone would be charged with
everything, no one would be convicted of anything, and the reasonable
doubt standard would have no meaning.
That something may be possible, however, is exactly what certain
states and the military courts have accepted as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in cases involving HIV-related aggravated assault. By lowering the
burden on the government to prove only that HIV could possibly be
transmitted, these jurisdictions have obviated the need for a reasonable
doubt standard. 9 There can be no scintilla of doubt, let alone a
United States v. Ytem, 255 F.3d 394, 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 397 (emphasis in original).
United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 1099, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
n United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1148 (8th Cir. 1996).
78 Clue (Paramount Pictures 1985) (paraphrased).
A different case is posed by statutes, like the one at issue in State v. Musser,
721 N.W.2d 734, 745 (Iowa 2006). The Iowa statute criminalizes "the
intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another
person in a manner that could result in the transmission of the human
immunodeficiency virus." The Iowa Supreme Court interpreted "could" to mean
"possible." Id. In Musser, the defendant argued that the statute as written was
overbroad and facially vague, but the court rejected those arguments. Id. at 74647. A statute will likely be deemed overbroad if it could interfere with
constitutionally protected behavior. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612
(1973). The defendant in Musser argued that the low "could" threshold meant
that the statute impinged on HIV-positive individuals' freedom of association
because it banned conduct, such as sweating on others during a game of
basketball or kissing another person, that bears no relation to HIV transmission.
74
7
76
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reasonable one, that HIV can theoretically be transmitted through sexual
intercourse. For that matter, HIV can theoretically be transmitted by oral
sex, spitting, biting, or getting scratched by a monkey, but each is less
likely than the one before it.80
B. GUILT IS PERSONAL
The possibility of conviction pursuant to a mistake is overshadowed
by the "certainty that [the defendant] would be stigmatized by the
conviction."8 1 This is another possible rationale for the In re Winship
decision. The reasonable doubt standard reduces the margin for factfinding error and places the burden of persuasion on the government in

Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 746. The court found the state's compelling need to stop
the spread of HIV overshadowed any marginal imposition on minor freedoms of
association. Id. Other courts have rejected this argument because the statutes did
not involve free speech. See, e.g., People v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ill.
1994) (finding not "even the slightest connection" between the case and free
speech). As to the void for vagueness argument, Mr. Musser argued that the
statute's failure to define the modes of transmission that are captured by the law
means that "anything is possible" is the standard. The court rejected that
interpretation, finding the statute clarified by "reference to common knowledge
and related statutes." Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 746. It is common knowledge, the
court said, that blood, semen, and other bodily fluids can transmit HIV and
other statutes referred to those bodily fluids listed by the Centers for Disease
Control as further clarification. Id. Musser involved a statute in which the
legislature explicitly created a low possibility standard. In Weeks v. State, 834
S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), the court interpreted the statute's phrase,
"tends," as meaning "could" without any specific instruction from the
legislature. And, in United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2008), the
military courts took an explicit standard, the "natural and probable
consequence" test, and lowered it to the "more than merely fanciful, speculative
and remote possibility" standard in contravention of the MCM's instruction. A
vagueness challenge may have more success against the statute in Weeks. This
Article does not address this argument because many states have already
rejected such arguments. See, e.g., People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208, 222-23
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (rejecting vagueness challenge to aggravated assault statute
because even though the statute did not specifically list prohibited activities, it
need only be sufficiently certain "to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice" that his conduct was forbidden); Russell, 630 N.E.2d at 796 (rejecting a
vagueness challenge to a statute with a possibility threshold-prohibiting
conduct that "could result in the transmission of HIV"-because it was "pure
speculation and conjecture" that the statute could prohibit innocent conduct.).
80
HIV Transmission - Frequently Asked Questions, AVERT, http://www.avert.o
rg/hiv-aids-transmission.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
8 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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order to protect the defendant from two independent errors-mistake and
82
stigmatization-both of which are anathematic to due process.
Stigmatization in the HIV context is evident in two ways. First, by
making it easier to convict HIV-positive defendants on aggravated
assault charges, conviction pursuant to nonspecific proof devalues In re
Winship's due process concern for the gravity of a criminal conviction.
Second, permitting this factual mistake necessarily stigmatizes HIVpositive individuals as presumptive criminals. If one HIV-positive
individual is considered to be just as infectious as another, all are
subsumed under the average transmission rate and that rate is sufficient
to prove likelihood of transmission for the purposes of aggravated
assault, then merely being HIV-positive fulfills an element of the crime.
This stigmatization is not only a product of assigning criminal
culpability to the status of being HIV-positive, but it speaks to a salient
rationale of the In re Winship Court: inherent in due process is that guilt
must be "personal."83
The reasonable doubt standard "provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence,84 and animates the correlative moral
assumption of the criminal law that conviction cannot be based on being
82 Id.

at 363-64. A closely related rationale is the principle summarized by
Justice Harlan's oft-quoted statement that "it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan built on significant common law history here. See 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1769) ("the law
holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer"); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (stating 'it must be

very warily pressed, for it is better five guilty persons should escape unpunished
than one innocent person should die') (quoting Lord Hale, 2 HALE P. C. 290
(1678)); Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "ReasonableDoubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,

981 n.6 (1993) ("'I should, indeed, prefer twenty guilty men to escape death

through mercy, than one innocent to be condemned unjustly."') (quoting SIR
JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 65 (Chrimes ed., 1942)
(1471)); id. at 981 n.7 (.'[I]t is better that ninety-nine ... offenders shall escape
than that one innocent man be condemned."') (quoting THOMAS STARKIE,
EVIDENCE 756 (1724)). But see JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE at 197 (M. Dumont ed., Eng. trans. 1981) (1825) ("At first it was said
to be better to save several guilty men, than to condemn a single innocent man;
others, to make the maxim more striking, fixed on the number ten, a third made
this ten a hundred, and a fourth made it a thousand. All these candidates for the
prize of humanity have been outstripped by I know not how many writers, who

hold, that, in no case, ought an accused to be condemned, unless the evidence
amount to mathematical or absolute certainty. According to this maxim, nobody
ought to be punished, lest an innocent man be punished.").

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
dissenting).
8 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.

640, 651 (1946)

(Rutledge, J.,
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a bad guy8 5 or being a member of a certain group. Defendants are guilty
not because they know, or are related to, known criminals8 6 or because
they share a common identity with disfavored groups. In Bridges v
Wixon, the Court faced a challenge to a statute that ordered deportation

of all aliens affiliated with groups that advocated the violent overthrow
of the government. 87 The Court stopped Bridges' deportation but
declined to address the constitutional issues in the case. Justice Murphy
would have declared the statute unconstitutional: "The deportation
statute completely ignores the traditional American doctrine requiring
personal guilt rather than guilt by association . . . . The doctrine of

personal guilt is one of the most fundamental principles of our
jurisprudence."88 Similarly, in Scales v. United States, though the Court
upheld a statute criminalizing membership in the Communist Party, it
saw personal guilt as a mandate of due process.89 Guilt is personal, the
Court held, and the only way vicarious conspiracy liability could meet
the requirements of due process was if the mens rea of a particular
defendant could be implied from the extent of his participation in the
Party's criminal activity.90
The personal guilt doctrine embodied in the reasonable doubt
standard does not protect only those whose associations engage in
85

Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM. L. REv.

920, 936 (1987).

See, e.g., Templeton v. United States, 151 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1945) ("We
think that the evidence adduced by the cross-examination of appellant and the
witnesses supporting his alibi that they were related to Hawk Carter, 'the
notorious bootlegger of Sumner County' was not only inadmissible but
prejudicial. The fact that appellant and his witnesses were related to Hawk
Carter, a reputed bootlegger, was irrelevant not only to the issues, but to the
subject matter of their examination. Carter was not shown to have had any
connection with the case. The sole purpose of this testimony was to degrade the
witnesses in the minds of the jury.").
87 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
" Id. at 163 (Murphy, J., concurring).
89 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
90
Id. at 227-28. This theory of personal guilt has been extended by lower courts
in areas outside the criminal law. See St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1974) (striking down a school regulation that suspended students if their parents
misbehaved in parent-teacher conferences); Tyson v. New York City Housing
Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (voiding agreements that terminated
tenants' public housing leases for the acts of the tenants' adult children); United
States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(applying the notion of "personal guilt" to a case involving the Takings Clause,
in which the federal government seized a truck because of the illegal activities
of the owner's son). More recently, in HumanitarianLaw Projectv. U.S.. Dep 't
of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), the doctrine of personal guilt has been
revived to declare unconstitutional statutes prohibiting "material support" to
certain terrorist organizations.
86
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criminal activity. Nor does it only have meaning as a counterweight to
legislative attempts to criminalize membership in such organizations, as
in Bridges and Scales. It represents a broader recognition that culpability
cannot be based on status, identity, or association, but must be based on
action. Evidence of identity or status (e.g., as a member of the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) or as one of millions of Americans who
are HIV-positive) is not evidence admissible to prove that one committed
a crime. The SDS may have been a radical anti-war group and it may
have organized most of the anti-war university protests in the late 1960s,
but mere membership in SDS did not prove any element of the crime of
assaulting a police officer-a crime with which SDS members were
charged during California's Stop the Draft week.91
Similarly, HIV-positive individuals charged with aggravated assault
for risking transmission of HIV face the risks of both factual mistake and
stigmatization when the elements of the crime can be proven with nonspecific proof. The average risk of transmission posed by the average
HIV-positive man who has a sexual encounter with the average HIVnegative woman does not speak to the particular risk posed by a
particular defendant's sexual encounter. The defendant may have an
exceedingly low viral load, which would place him far afield from the
hypothetical average. He also may not have had any of the risk factors
for making transmission more likely. To ignore these circumstances and
to convict based on averages or hypotheticals would be logical error.
Nevertheless, defendants charged with aggravated assault for having
unprotected sex while HIV-positive are confronted with this precise due
process error. Granted, being HIV-positive is nothing like being an antiwar protestor. But to allow the likelihood element of aggravated assault
to be proven without reference to a defendant's specific risk of
transmission is to subject a defendant to guilt by association. Rather than
considering separately the likelihood of transmission and the likelihood
of harm if transmission were to occur, some courts have looked only to
evidence of the latter. 92 This evidence helped meet the government's
burden on the likelihood prong of aggravated assault but had little to do
with the defendant's actual conduct. It did not prove "personal guilt."
The evidence describes general characteristics attributable to a
hypothetical person and symbolic of an entire class. If such evidence can
9' See FRED HALSTEAD, OUT Now! A PARTICIPANT'S ACCOUNT OF THE
MOVEMENT IN THE U.S. AGAINST THE VIETNAM WAR, 341-49 (1978)

(providing a brief historical introduction to California's "Stop the Draft" week).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 30 M.J. 53, 55 (C.M.A. 1990) (noting in
passing the lower court's sole consideration of the likelihood that HIV will
develop into AIDS); see also, United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235, 238
(C.A.A.F. 2008) (upholding a lower court's decision to use two different
valuations of likelihood, the one for transmission being so low as to find
"likely" transmission when the defendant had an undetectable viral load).
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prove an element of a crime, then mere membership in that classregardless of any unique facts that could distinguish a particular
individual from the crowd-becomes part of the crime.
IV. LOGICAL "ACCIDENT" AND DUE PROCESS ERRORS IN THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV TRANSMISSION THROUGH THE TRADITIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW

It has been almost thirty years since HIV and AIDS first came to the
attention of the criminal law.9 4 The prevalence of the disease has raised
questions like whether a defendant may be compelled to submit to HIV
testing for the purposes of criminal prosecution, 95 whether HIV test

This analysis survives the modem limits that have been placed on the Winship
doctrine. For a discussion of the narrowing reasonable doubt standard, see
Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 72, at 1095-09; Irene Merker
Rosenberg, Winship Redux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REv. 109, 114-17 (1990).
By way of example, the Court arguably eroded the reasonable doubt standard in
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), and Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228
(1987), by deferring to legislatures on what constituted an element of the
offense and what constituted an affirmative defense. Under In re Winship, as
limited by Patterson and Martin, the government only had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt those elements specifically prescribed by the legislature. But
that would not have helped Dacus, for example. In Dacus, 66 M.J. at 239
(C.A.A.F. 2008), the military court used a low "more than merely a fanciful,
speculative, or remote possibility" standard even though the MCM explicitly
stated that likelihood means "the natural and probable consequences" of
conduct. Patterson also erodes Winship's anti-formalism. In re Winship saw
through an attempt to arbitrarily distinguish burdens of proof based on whether
the defendant was a charged as a juvenile or an adult. Due process applied to
proceedings that for all intents and purposes were the same. In re Winship, 397
U.S. at 365-67. To relax the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard based on
formal and rather arbitrary lines drawn by state legislatures in Patterson and
Martin seems like a striking departure from In re Winship's substantive holding.
94 It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed history of how HIV
and AIDS have affected and changed the criminal law in the last thirty years.
For informative summaries, please see Damien Warburton, Critical Review of
English Law in Respect of Criminalising Blameworthy Behavior by HIV+
Individuals, 68 J. CRIM. L. 55 (2004) (with respect to the laws of Great Britain)
and Winifred H. Holland, "HIV/AIDS and the Criminal Law," 36 CRIM. L.Q.
279 (1993-1994) (with respect to the United States and Canada).
9 See, e.g., Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736 (Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding the constitutionality Penal Code Section 1202.6, which required
defendants convicted of solicitation or prostitution to undergo HIV testing based
on the "special need" of law enforcement to stop the spread of the AIDS
epidemic); People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992) (similar). But see State
v. Farmer, 805 P.2d 200, corrected, 812 P.2d 858 (Wash. 1991) (reversing an
order requiring defendant, convicted of soliciting and sexually exploiting two
juveniles, to submit to HIV testing before sentencing for the purpose of
corroborating that he had AIDS at the time he committed the crime since the
9
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results must be disclosed,96 whether evidence regarding a defendant's
HIV status is admissible during sentencing, 9 7 and whether a sexual
partner can consent to relations with an HIV-positive individual without
knowledge of the latter's HIV status. 98 Nor has there been a single
preferred manner of criminalizing HIV transmission. Some state
legislatures have created the crime of "criminal transmission of HIV" 99
test results could not relate back to the point at which the defendant committed
the crime and were, therefore, of no corroborative value).
96 See, e.g., Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d
13, 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)
(concluding that a defendant waives medical privacy, including in regards to his
HIV status, when he places his medical status at issue, such as by biting an
officer and threatening to transmit HIV). Notably, some jurisdictions have
found that HIV test results could be admitted under the business record
exception to the hearsay rule, without a chain of custody, where the defendant
had been tested voluntarily for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment, rather
than for the purposes of prosecution. See, e.g., Ex parte Dep't of Health & Env.
Control, 565 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 2002). But see People v. C.S., 583 N.E.2d 726
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that HIV-positive test results should not have been
disclosed to all attorneys in the county's criminal division in anticipation of
bringing appropriate criminal charges against defendant in the future, but these
tests could have been disclosed if there was a pending prosecution).
9 See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 359-60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding HIV status admissible during sentencing phase of a trial for aggravated
sexual assault of a child where defendant's HIV-positive status could be
considered "a circumstance of the offense" and a potential long-term effect of
the victim's injury).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 27 M.J. 798 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988) (holding
that a victim's consent was no defense to charges of aggravated assault arising
out of a sexual encounter between a teenager and an HIV-positive Air Force
sergeant).
99 See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 22-llA-21(c); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(33);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123, § 20-15-903; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
1621.5, 120290, 120291; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 647f, 12022.85; COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 18-3-415.5,
18-7-205.7, 18-7-201.7; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
381.0041(1l )(b), 384.24(2), 775.0877, 796.08(4); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(d); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-601, 39-608; ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-16.2; IND. CODE

§§ 35-42-1-7, 35-42-2-6(e), 35-42-2-6(f), 35-45-16-2(a)-(b), (d), 16-41-14-17;

IOWA CODE § 709C.1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3435; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
311.990(24)(b), 529.090(3)-(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43.5, 40:1062; MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210;
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-27-14(1)-(2); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 191.677, 567.020;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-112, 113; NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 201.205, 201.358,
441A.300; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.11, 2907.24, 2907.25, 2907.241, 2921.38, 2927.13;
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, §§ 1031, 1192.1; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 63, § 1-519; PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN §§ 2703, 2704, 5902; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-145, 44-29-60, 4429-140; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-18-31, 22-18-33, 22-18-34; TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-13-109, 68-10-107, 68-10-101; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1309,
76-5-102.6; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-67.4:1(A), 32.1-289.2; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.36.01 1.
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while other jurisdictions have taken recourse to common law crimes,
such as attempted murder or some form of aggravated assault.'o In the
latter case, the specific elements of the crime vary across jurisdictions,
but they usually involve some combination of the (1) use of a dangerous
weapon (2) in a physical attack (3) in a manner that is likely (4) to cause
serious harm or death.'o' It is when considering the likelihood element of
the crime that certain courts may commit the Accident Fallacy.
This Article studies proof of the likelihood element in HIV-related
aggravated assaults in two radically different contexts. The first series of
cases involves biting, where a belligerent HIV-positive individual bites
another person, usually a law enforcement officer. The second series of
cases involves consensual sexual intercourse between an HIV-positive
individual and an HIV-negative individual who is unaware of his or her
partner's HIV status. In some of these cases, courts commit only the first
step toward the Accident Fallacy, i.e., using general rules-of-thumb as
evidence. This occurs when the likelihood element is satisfied by
recourse to general data about HIV infections without determining if the
defendant differs from the norm in some way. In other cases, courts
commit the Accident Fallacy by taking a general rule of thumb and
inappropriately applying it to a unique situation. This occurs when the
defendant proves he deviates from the norm and yet the court still
applies the general rule to his case. In both scenarios, due process errors
accompany the logical errors.
A.

THE BITING CASES

Brock v. State is one in a series of "biting" cases, in which an HIVpositive individual bit his victim.' 02 It is also one of a series of cases
where the court sought generalized proof of the likelihood prong of the
crime, potentially misapplying a rule of thumb to a particular case in the
process. While only potential Accident Fallacies, these cases represent
real violations of due process.

'0o There are numerous variations to the crime of aggravated assault, including
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault with intent to
murder and aggravated sexual assault.
1o' See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-20(a)(1), 13A-1-2(12)) (2010); Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928(b)(1) (2011).
102 555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). There have apparently been two
suspected cases of HIV transmission resulting from biting. In these particular
cases, severe tissue tearing and damage were reported in addition to the
presence of blood. HIV Transmission - Frequently Asked Questions, AVERT,

http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-transmission.htm#q 15 (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).
In spite of this rarity, biting cases persist. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784 (4th Cir.
1995); State v. Bird, 692 N.E.2d 1013 (Ohio 1998).
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Brock was a prisoner confined to the AIDS unit of an Alabama
correctional facility where, during a routine search for contraband, he bit
a prison guard on the arm.10 3 As a result, Brock was charged with
attempted murder since he knew that the AIDS virus can be transmitted
"through bodily fluids secreted through the mouth."'1' He was found
guilty of the lesser-included offense of first degree assault. In Alabama at
the time, the first degree assault statute required the government to
prove, in relevant part, that the defendant "cause[d] serious physical
injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument."' 0 5 In dispute in this case was the "dangerous instrument"
prong, which was defined as anything that "under the circumstances in
which it is used. . . is highly capable of causing death or serious physical
injury."l06
This language is common to many aggravated assault statutes. In
Alabama, the "capability" of the weapon to cause great harm is modified
or delimited both by "highly" and by "the circumstances in which it is
used" in the particular case at hand. Therefore, in order to prove this
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the government must
put forth specific evidence that whatever weapon was used in this case
was actually used in a way that was highly capable of causing serious
harm or death.10 7 If the legislature had intended otherwise, it could have
crafted a first degree assault statute that omitted the modifier "highly." In
such a statute, the word "weapon" would modify the word "capable,"
implying that the proof of capability must be about the weapon itself. 08
In the Alabama statute at issue in Brock, the "circumstances in which
[the weapon] was used" modified the phrase "highly capable,"
suggesting a qualitatively different source of proof.
Even the Brock Court recognized this distinction when it noted that
Alabama follows the minority view that "depending upon the
circumstances of their use," fists could constitute "deadly weapons" or

Brock, 555 So. 2d at 286.
'0"Id. at 286-87.
103

1os

Id. at 287 (citing

§ 13A-6-20(a)(1) (2010)).
§ 13A-1-2(12) (2010)).
107 This interpretation has long been standard across jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Medford v. State, 216 S.W. 175, 177 (Tex. 1919) ("The element of the manner
of use of such weapon must always be taken into consideration. A shotgun
[fired] at such long range as to make it reasonably apparent that death or serious
bodily injury could not result from its use would not be legally a deadly
weapon.").
108 This aggravated assault formulation is arguably void for vagueness. See
supra note 79.
ALA. CODE

106 Id. (citing ALA. CODE
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"dangerous instruments" for the purposes of first degree assault.109
Therefore, the specific circumstances that gave rise to the indictment are
salient. To the court's credit, it found that the State failed to prove that
Brock used his bite in a way that was highly capable of causing serious
physical injury.110 In stating what evidence would have sufficed,
however, the court ignored the language of the statute and, if not for the
State's ineptitude, would have allowed the State to commit the Accident
Fallacy. In Brock, the State did not present any evidence about HIV or
AIDS in the form of expert testimony or scientific evidence. The record
was simply devoid of any proof, let alone proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or proof about Brock's individual condition. Therefore, the court
concluded that "[w]hile AIDS may very well be transmitted through a
human bite, there was no evidence to that effect at trial . . " It also
stated that "before this court, there was absolutely no evidence of the
capacity of a human bite to cause . . . serious physical injury."ll 2 But if
evidence that a hypothetical human bite could transmit HIV or AIDS
would have sufficed for the purposes of meeting the "highly capable"
prong of first degree assault, "the circumstances in which it is used"
prong and the individual characteristics of the bite are neglected entirely.
The court would have accepted generalized proof, if any existed, of the
rule of thumb that HIV can be transmitted through a human bite. Had it
applied that general rule to this case, the court might have committed the
Fallacy of Accident and lessened the prosecution's burden by broadening
an essential element of the crime.
This would have had two implications. First, the sentence would
have changed dramatically. Had the State submitted even some
generalized evidence as to the possible relationship between a bite and
HIV transmission, Brock would have been convicted of first-degree
assault rather than second-degree assault." 3 The former is a class B
felony, which carries with it a sentence of not less than two years and not
more than twenty years imprisonment,'l4 along with a fine which was
not to exceed $10,000.115 The punishment for second degree assault is
half that."' Dumb luck saved Brock from a misapplication of the law.
109 Brock, 555 So. 2d at 287 (citing Hollis v. State, 417 So. 2d 617, 619 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982) and Stewart v. State, 405 So. 2d 402, 405 (Ala. Crim. App.
1981)).
110d.

11Id. at 288 (emphasis added).

Id. (emphasis added).
The other elements of the crime of first-degree assault were not in serious
dispute.
114 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6
(2010).
"5 See Singleton v. State, 715 So.2d 233 (1997). Alabama has since revised
their maximum fines. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-11 (2010).
116 Id. By comparison, violating Alabama's criminal transmission
of HIV
statute, codified at ALA. CODE § 22-lIA-21(c) (2010), is a class C
112
113
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Second, HIV was treated differently than other "deadly instruments."
The court recognized the importance of the particular circumstances in
which the defendant used the weapon when it noted that fists could be
considered dangerous instruments. In Alabama, fists may only constitute
deadly weapons "depending upon the circumstances and manner of their
use." "7 But those circumstances were ignored in Brock where an HIVpositive defendant's bite was the weapon. Whatever the reason for this
unsubstantiated distinction between how different "weapons" or
"instruments" of harm are treated, the discrimination has resulted in a de
facto lower burden for the prosecution in HIV cases.
A similar error occurred in the Georgia case of Scroggins v. State."8
During a violent fracas involving officers, a belligerent Scroggins
brought up saliva into his mouth and bit an officer on the forearm,
tearing through the officer's shirt and leaving distinct bite marks on the
skin which took ten months to heal.' 19 A jury convicted him of
aggravated assault with intent to murder, and Scroggins appealed,
claiming that "there was no evidence the HIV virus can be transmitted
by human saliva, . . . [and] there is at best only a 'theoretical possibility'

the virus can be transmitted" this way.120
Scroggins identified the potential for two logical fallacies. At trial, a
medical expert testified that while theoretically possible, there had been
no documented cases and only two reports of HIV transmission through
saliva.121 Scroggins argued, therefore, that he was the victim of an
illogical double whammy where a hasty generalization,1 22 creating a
misdemeanor, which carries with it a sentence of up to three months
imprisonment. The statute states as follows: "Any person afflicted with a
sexually transmitted disease who knowingly transmits, assumes the risk of
transmitting, or does any act which will probably or likely transmit such disease
to another person is guilty of a class C misdemeanor." HIV is included among
STDs. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-4-1-.03 (2010).
"7 Brock, 555 So. 2d at 287.
1.8

401 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).

'l 9 Id. at

15.
12o Id. at 16.

121Id. at 19.

To form a general rule from insufficient or special facts is to commit the
fallacy of hasty generalization or converse accident. See COPI, supra note 50, at
82. Professor Copi provides a classic example: "[O]bserving the value of
opiates when administered by a physician to alleviate the pains of those who are
seriously ill, one may be led to propose that narcotics be made available to
everyone." Id. Such reasoning is erroneous because it creates a general rule
from too few and unrepresentative examples. A more common example comes
from political polling, where polls based on narrow or unrepresentative crosssections of the population commit this error. Nate Silver of
FiveThirtyEight.com highlighted a September 2010 example in polling for
California's gubernatorial contest between Republican Meg Whitman and
122
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general rule from insufficient facts, was erroneously applied to the
unique circumstances, or "accidents," of his case. Even if it were
possible to transmit the disease through a bite, he argued that his
particular bite could not. 12 3
Unfortunately for Scroggins, he misread the Georgia statute. The
operative section of the Georgia criminal code states that "[a] person
commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults: . . . (1) With
intent to murder, to rape, or to rob; or . .. (2) With a deadly weapon or

with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively
against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily
injury."l24 Evidence that HIV could be transmitted via human saliva was
unnecessary if the State could prove Scroggins' guilt under the first
clause. Only his intent mattered. The court found the jury's finding of
intent to be supported by the evidence that Scroggins sucked up excess
sputum, bragged about his recent HIV-positive diagnosis, and laughed
when the officer asked whether he had AIDS.12 5
Responding to the merits of Scroggins' argument in dicta, the court
concluded as Scroggins feared. The expert had testified that even though
there were only two unconfirmed reports of transmission through biting,
he would not French kiss an HIV-positive woman and that standard
medical procedure required physicians to wear protective gloves when
dealing with any bodily fluids. 12 6 After this and other testimony from the
Democratic Attorney General and former Governor Jerry Brown. One poll that
showed Mr. Brown extending his lead drew fire from Ms. Whitman's pollsters
as based on an unrepresentative sampling that overemphasized traditionally
Democratic voters. Nate Silver, Analyzing Whitman's Questions About
California Poll, NEW YORK TIMEs FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (Sept. 27,

2010, 10:37 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/analyzin
g-whitmans-questions-about-california-poll/.
Hasty generalizations are common in the courtroom testimonies of
lackluster medical experts. In O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F.

Supp. 1376 (D. Ill. 1992), for example, an ophthalmologist testified that the
plaintiffs cataracts were caused by exposure to nuclear radiation in the course
of his employment at a nuclear power plant. He based this "binding universal
rule" on his past treatment of five patients whose cataracts looked similar to the
plaintiffs. Id. at 1391. The trial judge recognized the error and disqualified the
expert from delivering certain testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Id. The expert
was like those, "observing the value of opiates when administered by a
physician to alleviate the pains of those who are seriously ill, ... [who] may be
led to propose that narcotics be made available to everyone." Id. (quoting COPI
at 68).
123 Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 16.
124 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21(a)(1)-(2) (partially cited in Scroggins,
401 S.E.2d
at 16 (emphasis in original)).
125 Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d
at 18.
26
1 Id. at 19.
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expert, the court concluded that "hardly anything (could be] ruled out as
'impossible"' and, therefore, the jury could rationally "consider the
human bite of a person infected with the AIDS virus" to be deadly.12 7
That recourse to a hypothetical person was not a linguistic oversight. The
court made clear its willingness to accept generalized proof of likelihood
of infection from the bite of some hypothetical person, rather than from
Scroggins, when it used risk assessments in evidence to define the word
"deadly" in the aggravated assault statute:
The expert testified that the "risk" of transmitting the
virus via saliva was somewhat less than the documented
risk of transmitting the virus into the blood stream via a
needle prick, which was one in 250. From this, we think
a reasonable juror could conclude, in common wisdom,
that the statistical "risk" of contracting AIDS from an
infected person via a needle prick is in actuality a
random risk, which alike applies to each and every one
of the 250 persons, or to all of them if a large enough
theory group is considered, i.e., the total population; and
that therefore every needle prick introducing the blood of
an infected person is as potentially deadly as the next,
and therefore, in the most reasonable common sense of
the word, every one is deadly. The same may be said of
the supposed much-reduced "risk" of transmitting the
virus through saliva.'128
Every needle prick, like every sample of saliva, the argument goes,
carries the same risk across all HIV-positive needles and saliva,
respectively. That may indeed suffice as a neat heuristic or rule of thumb
to discourage needle sharing or spitting on people, but it cannot survive
as a logical rule of law for two reasons, both of which were also true in
Brock. First, it assumes homogeneity in the HIV-positive population. If
the blood of one HIV-positive person is "as potentially deadly" as the
blood of any other HIV-positive person, HIV-positive persons become
fungible. If that were true, recourse to the general assumption that saliva
can transmit HIV in some hypothetical case would have merit; just as
generalized proof of a hypothetical bite in Brock would suffice to prove
the elements of first degree assault. But, of course, that has never been
true. Even as early as 1990, when Scroggins stood trial, immunologists
could determine the relative infectiousness of HIV-positive patients.129
Variety comes from the stage of infection, CD4+ T-cell count, viral load,
symptom manifestation, aggravating infections, and other factors.130 To
127 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
128 Id. (emphasis added).
129 See MURPHY, supra note 18,
at 13-16.

130 See id. at 13-16, 67, 72-76, 105-11.
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consider one HIV-positive individual to be the same as any other is to
ignore science and common sense.
The second logical fallacy is created by the alleviation of the State's
burden of persuasion on the likelihood prong. Like the Alabama statute
at issue in Brock, the Georgia aggravated assault statute includes a
circumstances-contingent element that states that the object, device, or
instrument used must be used "offensively against a person." If
statistical analysis from a hypothetical bite or saliva is sufficient for
determining likelihood, then the particular manner in which either was
used becomes irrelevant. Allowing this type of proof to satisfy the State's
evidentiary burden, therefore, would be tantamount to ignoring the
words of the legislature.' 3 '
Scroggins also illustrates the second due process error common to
many HIV-related aggravated assault cases. The statute requires "an
instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to . .
result in serious bodily injury."1 32 As evidence of likelihood, the court
noted that it would have accepted the medical conclusion that "hardly
anything [is] impossible."1 33 In doing so, the court lowered the State's
burden from proving that something is likely to proving that it is
possible. It is difficult to imagine what proof would not be sufficient
under an "anything is possible" standard.
Weeks v. State' 3 4 further illustrates the defects in Brock and
Scroggins. In Weeks, the defendant spit in a prison officer's face during a
belligerent tantrum. The saliva covered the guard's glasses, lips, and
131 Courts

have a duty "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v.
Duncan
statute."
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
132 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21(a)(1)-(2).
"3 Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 20.
134 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Biting and spitting cases continued
well into the 1990s, even though scientific research had all but conclusively
shown that such actions could not transmit HIV under any circumstances. Even
the lion's share of federal courts to address the issue had conceded as much.
See, e.g., Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 539 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988) ("You
won't get AIDS from saliva, sweat, tears, urine or a bowel movement." (quoting
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. HHS-88-8404,
UNDERSTANDING AIDS, 2 (1988))); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d
701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Although HIV has been isolated in several body
fluids, epidemiological evidence has implicated only blood, semen, vaginal
secretions, and possibly breast milk in transmission. Extensive and numerous
studies have consistently found no apparent risk of HIV infection to individuals
exposed through close, non-sexual contact with AIDS patients."); Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("The
overwhelming weight of medical evidence is that the AIDS virus is not
transmitted by human bites, even bites that break the skin.").
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nose. 13 5 Weeks was convicted of attempted murder, which in Texas,
requires the specific intent to commit murder as well as an overt act that
"tends but fails to effect the commission" of the murder.' 36 On appeal
and in his habeas proceeding, Weeks argued that the State failed to prove
an element of the offense because it offered insufficient evidence to
prove that his spit "tend[ed] to" cause death.13 7 On direct appeal, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals equated "tends to" with "can,"l38
significantly easing the State's burden, and found the evidence sufficient
to convict where medical experts testified that the possibility of
transmission was low, "but certainly not zero." 3 9 Like the court in
Scroggins, the Weeks court accepted the "any possibility" standard.
Lowering the State's burden to require proof of possibility rather
than some level of probability certainly doomed Weeks's case. However,
Weeks does represent an improvement over Brock and Scroggins because
the medical testimony in Weeks included specific testimony as to the
capacity of Weeks's saliva to transmit the disease. In fact, one expert
discussed a study showing that HIV developed in saliva in three out of
fifty-five instances and that the chances of HIV being in saliva increased
if there was blood present.140 Another expert examined Weeks and found
evidence of gingivitis and tartar on his gums. 141 Gingivitis and the
irritation caused by tartar, the expert noted, can result in blood in the
saliva.142 In addition, Weeks's medical records showed that his HIV was
moderately advanced and that he experienced nausea, vomiting, and
diarrhea near the time of the incident, increasing the likelihood that
Weeks had lesions in his mouth or blood in his saliva.14 3 Three experts
agreed that the degree of probability of infection through saliva
depended upon where the spit landed with one stating that the eyes and
nasal cavity were "exceptionally" bad places for contact.144 Weeks's spit
landed on the victim's glasses, lips and nose.14 5 Additionally, an expert
explained that the chances of transmitting the virus increase as the stage

' Weeks, 834 S.W.2d at 561. The tantrum also included loud cursing,
complaining about his restraints, threats to "cut one of the boss's heads off," and
banging his head against a van wall. For the purposes of proving intent, the state
also proved that Weeks yelled that he was "medical now" and that he was
"going to take somebody with him when he went." Id.
36
' Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.0 1(a)).
'3 Id.; Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1995).
131 Weeks, 834 S.W.2d at 561-62.
'39 Id. at 562.
140 Id.
14 1 id.

142

Id. at 562, 564.
Id. at 564.
'" Id. at 563.
143

145 Id. at 561.
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of the infection progresses. 14 6 Another expert testified that Weeks's
medical records showed that he was HIV-4 one week before he spit on
the prison officer, 14 7 thus distinguishing the risk of contagion from
Weeks's blood from that of another HIV-positive individual whose
condition had not progressed as far. Under the low standard set by the
Texas courts, this testimony sufficiently proved that HIV was likely toor could-be transmitted through Weeks ' saliva as opposed to that of a
hypothetical HIV-positive individual.
The salient difference between Weeks, on the one hand, and Brock
and Scroggins, on the other hand, is the specificity of proof. In Weeks,
expert testimony on the risk of HIV transmission directly related to the
likelihood that Weeks's particular actions could have transmitted HIV. In
Brock and Scroggins, the expert testimony spoke only to a hypothetical
risk of transmission that could apply to any case involving any HIVpositive defendant, regardless of his or her unique "accidents" or
circumstances. Reasoning from such generality is not only illogical and
contrary to due process, but it is also unnecessary. Weeks does, however,
share one problem with Scroggins: it uses the erroneous "mere
possibility" standard to prove the risk of transmission.
B.

THE SEX CASES

Aggravated assault charges against HIV-positive individuals who
have unprotected sex without informing their partners of their HIV status
have been more common than similar charges for biting.148 Whether
Id. at 563. See discussion supra Part I: The Science of the Likelihood of
Transmitting HIV for a more thorough explanation of the different stages of
HIV. While the case refers to the stages of HIV as HIV-1, HIV-2, HIV-3, and
HIV-4, this is was a poor choice in terms since HIV-1 and HIV-2 are different
strains of the virus, not different stages of progression.
146

147 Id.
148

See, e.g., Robert Mackey, German Pop Singer on Trialfor ConcealingH.I. V.
Status From Sexual Partners, THE LEDE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 16, 2010, 4:23

PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/german-pop-singer-on-trialfor-concealing-h-i-v-status-from-sexual
partners/?scp=1&sq=nadja%20benaissa&st-cse (German pop singer Nadja
Benaissa was charged with aggravated assault for having unprotected sex with a
man without telling him she was HIV-positive); Brian Rogers, When HIV is
Deemed a Deadly Weapon, Hous.

CHRON.,

Mar. 22, 2010, at B (Kevin Lee

Sellars charged with aggravated assault of a 15-year-old boy); Bill Vidonic,
Inmate Charged in Jail Sex Incident, BEAVER COUNTY TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009
(Jeffrey Sloppy charged with aggravated assault after allowing another inmate
to perform oral sex on him); Diane Jennings, Man Who Spread HIV Gets 45
Years, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 30, 2009, at lB (Philippe Padieu found
guilty of six counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for having
unprotected sex with women without telling them he was HIV-positive); Matt
Gagne, Local Briefs, BELLINGHAM HERALD, Aug. 30, 2006, at 3A (Michelle
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these acts occur more often or simply are charged more often is unclear.
What is clear is that certain jurisdictions tackling this behavior through
aggravated assault continue to alleviate the State's logical and
constitutional burden of proving that a given defendant's particular
behavior satisfied the likelihood prong of the crime.
State v. Whitfieldl4 9 represents a problem outside the aggravated
assault context, but is still emblematic of the kind of generalized proof
some jurisdictions use to convict HIV-positive individuals of attempting
to transmit the disease. In Whitfield, the defendant was convicted of
seventeen counts of assault in the first degree for having unprotected sex
with seventeen women without informing them of his HIV-positive
status.1 5 0 Dr. Diana Yu, a medical expert, testified at trial that HIV and
AIDS are incurable, that HIV eventually leads to AIDS, that the
statistical risk of a female getting infected from unprotected vaginal
intercourse with an HIV-positive male is four percent, and that who
becomes infected from intercourse and who does not is unpredictable."'
Dr. Yu also testified that 'every incidence of sexual activity would be a
Pauline Whonnock charged with aggravated assault after having unprotected
sex without disclosing she was HIV-positive); Man Again Faces Assault
Charge; Allegedly Didn't Tell Woman He HadHIV, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5,
2006, available at 5/5/06 APALERTCRIM 01:16:19 (Edward Kelly, recently
released from prison, charged with aggravated sexual assault for unprotected
sex with a woman unaware of his HIV-positive status); HIV-Positive Man
Found Guilty of Knowingly Spreading HIV to Sexual Partners, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 14, 2005, availableat 12/14/05 APALERTCRIM 02:53:07 (Adrian
Nduwayo charged with aggravated sexual assault in British Columbia); Man
with HIV is Charged with Sexual Assault, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 9, 2005, at D3
(Patrick Green charged with aggravated sexual assault in Ontario); Laurie
Mason, HIV-Positive Man Admits Sex Assaults, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at 4C (Michael Silverman pleaded no contest to
committing aggravated sexual assault); Man with HIV Sentenced for Having
Unprotected Sex, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 5, 2002, at 2A (James
Willison sentenced to eight to sixteen years after pleading guilty to two counts
of aggravated assault); ProsecutorsAccuse Texan of Using HIV as a Weapon,
HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 15, 2001, at A42 (Paul Leslie Hollingsworth plead guilty
to charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon); Debbie Garlicki, AIDS
Murder Trial Delayed by Defendant's Condition, MORNING CALL, Apr. 29,
2000, at B09 (Eric Middleton charged with murder and aggravated assault in
Lehigh County, Pennsylvania); Libby Avery & Vivienne Heines, Corpus
Christi Courts: Small-Town Courtesy, Big-Time Cases, TEX. LAWYER, Aug. 18,
1997, at 14 (Thomas Anthony Zule convicted of aggravated sexual assault);
Breea Willingham, AIDS Virus Central to Local Trial, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., July 6, 1997, at BI (Andrew Lee Monk charged with using HIV as a
deadly weapon in rape of a girl and discussing five other similar cases in
previous years across jurisdictions).
" 134 P.3d 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 1207-08.
" Id. at 1209.
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period of exposure,' although not every exposure would necessarily
transmit HIV."l 52 Nothing about the stage of Whitfield's condition, his
response to medication or his symptoms factored into the court's
consideration. According to Washington State, assault in the first degree,
is committed when, "with intent to inflict great bodily harm . . . [a
person] exposes, or transmits to . . . another . . . the human

immunodeficiency virus.',15 ' Any form of sexual contact represents
exposure, so even if the court had sought specific proof as to the nature
of Whitfield's condition and his unique risk of transmission, it would
have been irrelevant. Washington statutorily adopted the "anything is
possible" standard as sufficient grounds for conviction.
Whitfield's crimes and the resulting legal problems have popped up
in the military courts as well. 5 4 Aggravated assault in the military is
governed by Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ),'" which states that anyone under UCMJ jurisdiction who
52

Id. at 1214.
Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.01 1(1)(b)) (emphasis in original).
154 See, e.g., Matthew Barakat, Navy Chaplain Gets Two Years for Sex Crime,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2007, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/06/AR2007120601332.html; Estes Thompson,
Authorities: Solider Who Didn't Disclose HIV Faces Assault Charges,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 18, 2007, available at 7/18/07 APALERTNC 03:01:56
(Private First Class (Pfc) Johnny Lamar Dalton charged with assault with a
deadly weapon for having unprotected sex with an 18-year-old civilian unaware
of his HIV status); HIV-Positive Army Private Pleads Guilty to Assault,
DESERET NEWS, Jan. 20, 1999 (Private Gerland Squires charged with
aggravated assault for not telling eight sexual partners of her HIV-positive
status); Fort Carson Soldier Guilty in AIDS Case, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Jan. 14, 1994, at 8A (Army Specialist Quincey Mason guilty of
aggravated assault and other counts); Soldier with AIDS Virus Gets 2 Months,
MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 1988, at 12A (Private Adrian Morris acquitted of
aggravated assault but sentenced on lesser charges).
' 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2011). Aggravated assault cases in the military are unique
in part because of the military's heightened health and wellness requirements.
This important interest has given rise to a host of Department of Defense and
service regulations governing HIV-positive service members. For example,
upon testing positive for HIV in the military, medical officers counsel the
service member about the possibility of transmitting the virus. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 6485.1, § E9.1.1. See also, United States v. Klauck, 47
M.J. 24, 25 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (affirming officer's conviction for assault for
failing to inform another officer that he was HIV-positive before engaging in
sexual intercourse). In 2004, the Department of Defense updated the military's
HIV testing program to require testing at intervals of two years at most. See
Memorandum from William Winkenwerder, Jr., M.D., Asst. Sec'y of Defense,
to Asst. Sec'y of the Army, Asst. Sec'y of the Navy, and Asst. Sec'y of the Air
Force (Mar. 29, 2004). A commander's order to engage in safe sex is not only
relevant as a matter of public health, but also as a tool of the criminal law. If a
service member so ordered engages in unprotected sex, the service member will
1

'5
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"commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or other means . . . likely
to produce death or grievous bodily harm" is guilty of aggravated
assault. 156 This language is similar to the language at issue in Brock and
Weeks in that each clearly uses likelihood as a way to describe how the
weapon or other instrument is used in the assault. In the ordinary
aggravated assault case, then, satisfying this formulation beyond a
reasonable doubt requires answering four questions: First, what weapon
or means of force did the defendant use? Second, how was that
instrument of harm used? Third, does that mode of use make serious
harm likely? And, fourth, what level of probability qualifies as "likely"?
The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) sheds some light on these issues:
[A] bottle, beer glass, a rock, a bunk adaptor, a piece of
pipe, a piece of wood, boiling water, drugs, or a rifle
butt may be used in a manner likely to inflict death or
grievous bodily harm. On the other hand, an unloaded
pistol, when presented as a firearm and not as a
bludgeon, is not a dangerous weapon or a means of
force likely to produce grievous bodily harm, whether or
not the assailant knew it was unloaded.157
Therefore, consideration of the particular manner in which the defendant
uses his or her weapon is essential to proving aggravated assault, as is
the likelihood that that particular use could cause harm. For the purposes
of aggravated assault, the MCM defines "likely" as when "the natural
and probable consequence of a particular use of any means or force

would be death or grievous bodily harm."' 58 This language is notable for
two reasons: First, it appears to set the military apart from courts in
Texas and Georgia, which, as discussed in Weeks and Scroggins, accept
mere possibility as sufficient evidence of likelihood without direction
from the legislature.15 9 The military requires a higher threshold of
likelihood. Second, it makes the need for specific proof clear. Likelihood
can only be determined from a defendant's "particular use" of whatever
means he has employed. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

be charged with-and most likely found guilty of-violating a lawful order,
regardless of the fate of other charges against him under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). Most military cases discussed in this Article include
such a specification in conjunction with an aggravated assault charge. See, e.g.,
Dacus, 66 M.J. 235, 236 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
156 Art. 128(b)(1), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 928(b)(1) (2011).
15

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (MCM), Part IV,

T 54.c(4)(a)(ii)

(2008 ed.). Established by Exec. Order No. 12473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (Apr.
13, 1984). The MCM is a detailed guide to the conduct and procedure for
courts-martial promulgated by the President.
58
1 Id. (emphasis added).
159 See supra Part IV. A.: The Biting Cases.
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(C.A.A.F.) made this clear in United States v. Outhier.160 Distinguishing
between circumstances that could make a weapon qualify as a "means
likely" to cause harm and those circumstances that could not, the court
noted that there is always a
lynch-pin between a means that is used in a manner
"likely" to produce death or grievous bodily harm and
one that is not. . . . [Some] "means" . . . [a]re unique for
an aggravated assault case, i.e., a fist. . . . The question

is whether the means were "used in a manner likely to
produce death or grievous bodily harm." Thus, in this
instance, the circumstances define whether the means
used were employed in a manner likely to cause
grievous bodily harm or whether appellant's actions
were performed in such a manner that the natural and
probable consequences were necessarily death or
grievous bodily harm. 6 1
In the standard aggravated assault case involving deadly weapons,
therefore, the court took the MCM's explanation to heart. Circumstances
matter and likelihood is contingent upon the natural and probable
consequences of using a weapon under those circumstances. This would
appear to disqualify the kind of generalized evidence relied upon in
Brock and Scroggins.
The UCMJ, MCM, and C.A.A.F.'s precedents thus offer military
prosecutors clear instructions on how to indict and prove the elements of
aggravated assault for an HIV-positive service member who has sex
without informing his partner of his HIV-positive status. The particular
nature of the defendant's condition and its correlative risk of
transmission are essential elements of that calculus because both factor
into determining the consequences of the sexual act and whether those
consequences were "natural and probable." But, as the cases suggest,
these instructions were ignored in two distinct ways.
First, the military courts, like the state courts in Brock and
Scroggins, have ignored the particular circumstances of the HIV-positive
defendant on trial. In United States v. Johnson,162 for example, a general
court-martial convicted the appellant, in relevant part, of aggravated
assault for engaging in oral sodomy while HIV-positive and attempted
aggravated assault for attempting to engage in anal sodomy with another
man.163 A physician with the Air Force Medical Corps testified that there
was a thirty-five percent chance that an HIV-positive individual will
160

161
162

163

45 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

Id. at 329 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
30 M.J. 53 (C.M.A. 1990).
Id. at 54.
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develop AIDS and that mortality rates were currently fifty percent.'
Notably, the court felt compelled to cite other evidence stating that
nearly ninety-nine percent of those infected with HIV will develop
AIDS. 165 The physician also testified that intravenous drug use and
unprotected sex represented the greatest risks for transmission and that
the risk increased with anal intercourse or if either partner has "genital
ulcers" or other abrasions.1 6 6 He admitted that fellatio is an "unlikely"
means of transmission of HIV.'67 The only evidence of Sergeant
Johnson's conduct was that he performed oral sex on another man and
intended to engage in anal sodomy before his partner objected. There
was no indication that Johnson had any genital ulcers or exhibited any
risk enhancement factors, nor was intravenous drug use at issue. Still, the
court found the physician's testimony sufficient to prove the likelihood
prong of aggravated assault.168
The court's evident gloss over the explanatory language in the MCM
is one striking feature of this case. The other is its inexplicable ignorance
about HIV given the extent of military regulations governing HIVpositive service members. The court made its decision without
considering whether Johnson conformed to a rule of thumb-that HIV
can be transmitted through sexual intercourse-or was unique in some
way. After all, the Accident Fallacy only occurs when a general rule of
thumb is applied to a particular case that is somehow unique, different,
or outside the general rule. In Johnson and a series of similar cases, the
court must have assumed that differentiation among HIV-positive
individuals was impossible. In Klauck, the court believed that an
aggravated assault may occur "any time" one person exposes another to
a deadly disease, as if there were no differences between diseases,
patients, or circumstances.' 69 But, as early at 1991, when the Department
of Defense issued Directive 6485.1 governing the military's policy
toward HIV and AIDS, it was clear that the military could distinguish
between types of HIV-positive individuals.' 70 It is also clear that at the
' Id. at 55.
6
s Id. at 55 n.4.
166 Id. at 55.

1

167id
1 Id. at
169

57.

47 M.J. at 25 (quoting United States v. Joseph, 37 M.J. 392, 396 (C.M.A.

1993)).

Military policy identified six distinct stages of HIV, each with particular
characteristics, some of which are summarized in the following chart:
Stage HIV-1 Chronic
T-Helper Delayed
Thrush Opportunistic
Antibod LymphCells per
HyperInfection
y and/or adenopathy Cubic
sensitivity
Virus
Millimeter
170

Isolation

(mm)
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time of Johnson's case, CD4+ cell testing could quickly and easily
distinguish between types of HIV infections and how they manifested in
a particular individual.17 ' Why such distinctions could not be used to
classify HIV-positive criminal defendants is unclear.
Johnson, therefore, is a pure example of the Accident Fallacy and its
correlative due process violation. The unique activity that gave rise to
the assault charge should have distinguished Johnson from the average
case. The court in Johnson operated under the general rule that
unprotected sex, in whatever form, could transmit a deadly disease.
Blind to any unique "accidents" in Sergeant Johnson's case and relying
on medical testimony that only tended to validate a general rule of thumb
rather than its particular applicability to this case, the court erroneously
used a broad generalization as proof of criminal activity. What made that
due process violation possible, however, was a second parallel due
process error that lowered the government's burden of proof as to
likelihood from the MCM's "natural and probable consequences"
standard to the simple and clearly lower requirement of "more than
merely a fanciful, speculative, or remote possibility."1 7 2 In doing so,
C.A.A.F. transformed the MCM's meaningful definition of "likelihood"
into an "anything is possible" standard similar to the one used in
Scroggins, Weeks, and Whitfield.173
Lowering the government's burden is the second way by which the
military courts have ignored the plain language of the UCMJ and MCM
and, in so doing, violated the due process rights of HIV-positive criminal
defendants. To see the contours and gravity of both of these errors,
1

+

-

GT400
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2

+

+

GT400

WNL
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LT400

WNL
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LT400
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+
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+

6

+

+/-

LT400

P/C

+/-

+

(GT = greater than; LT = less than)
DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 6485.1, § E2.2.1.
Murphy, supra note 18, at 67-76. Viral load testing, which is thought to be
more precise than CD4+ cell count in regards to risk, was not yet available.
172 United States v. Johnson, 30 M.J. 53, 57
(C.M.A. 1990).
173 See supra Part IV. A.: The Biting Cases for discussion
of Scroggins and
17i

Weeks and Part IV. B.: The Sex Cases for discussion of Whitfield. In Whitfield,
the lower standard was actually written into the statute by the legislature, rather
than created by judicial fiat.
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consider the case of United States v. Dacusl 4 and the jurisprudential
history on which it stands. Dacus was HIV-positive and had known
about his condition since 1996. From then on, he received various
briefings from commanders and medical professionals concerning his
virus, the disease's possible effects and transmission, and his
responsibility to inform all prospective sexual partners of his HIV
status.175 During his providence inquiry,176 Dacus admitted that he knew
he should have discussed his HTV status before engaging in sexual
activity, that he knew wearing a condom could not always prevent
transmission, and that he understood he could transmit the virus through
pre-ejaculate fluid.177 In July 2004, Dacus had sex with two female staff
sergeants-once with one and eleven times with the other. He failed to
inform either woman of his HIV-positive status, and though he allegedly
wore a condom when having sex on one occasion, he admitted that he
did not wear one on several other occasions.17 8
During his sentencing hearing, Dacus presented the testimony of Dr.
Mark Wallace, an expert in AIDS and infectious disease.' 7 9 Dr. Wallace
testified that the likelihood of transmission of HIV from one person to
another is a direct function of the viral load, which is a measure of the
extent of the virus's presence in an individual's system.'80 He further
noted that, according to a recent study out of Rakai, Uganda, a person
with a viral load of 38,000 would have a 1 in 450 chance of transmitting
the HIV virus for every heterosexual act of sexual intercourse, whereas a
person with a viral load under 1,700 would have a 1 in 10,000 chance of
doing so.' 8 ' When a person uses a condom, the risk of transmitting the
HIV virus falls by an additional 80 to 90 percent.182 After examining
Dacus, Dr. Wallace also noted that Dacus's viral load was so low as to be
66 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Dacus came to C.A.A.F. based on a guilty
plea, so the court never had occasion to address legal sufficiency of the proof of
Dacus's guilt. Instead, the court analyzed whether the plea had a substantial
basis in law and fact. Id. at 236. This does not change the analysis that follows,
however.
1s Transcript of Record at 26, United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F.
2008) (No. 20050404).
176 A providence inquiry is similar to a plea hearing. During a providence
174

inquiry, a military judge must hear the defendant's plea and determine whether
he offers facts sufficient to prove every element of the crime to which he
pleaded guilty. See SHANOR & HOGUE, supra note 15, at 286-89.
177 Transcript of Record, supra note
175, at 27, 31.
18 Id. at 27-29.
179 Id. at 91-92. Dr. Wallace's name is redacted from
the trial transcript, but
stated openly in the court's final decision. Because the reason for the redaction

is unclear and because Dr. Wallace's name appears numerous times in the final
decision, his name will be used here.
so Id. at 97.
81
Id. at 98-100.
18 2 Id. at 100-01.
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undetectable by existing technology, estimating that it was somewhere
between one and fifty.183 As such, using the Rakai numbers, Dacus had a
maximum 1 in 612,000 chance of transmitting the HIV virus to the first
staff sergeant if there was any pre-ejaculate fluid present and a maximum
1 in 440,000 chance of transmitting HIV to the second. Dacus was in
fact a "very, very rare" HIV-positive individual whose immune system
could suppress replication of HIV without medication.184 While Dacus
could still transmit the HIV virus despite his low viral load, his
likelihood of doing so was "[e]xtremely low" or "very, very unlikely.", 85
This case had one promising feature: the evidence at trial as to
Dacus's viral load and the particular type and frequency of sexual
contact with two staff sergeants went directly to the unique "accidents"
of Dacus's case. His single sexual act with one of his sexual partners
made transmission less likely and his exceedingly low viral load put him
on the fringe of transmission risk in all cases. However, even though
Dacus was able to offer specific evidence of his unique situation, the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeal (AFCCA) found the evidence consistent
with a plea of guilty to aggravated assault because, according to
C.A.A.F. precedents, the risk of transmission need only be "more than
merely a fanciful, speculative, or remote possibility."' 86 The court
committed two errors in one. By virtue of his undetectable viral load and
the infrequency of sexual contact, Dacus's case was indeed unique. Yet,
the "anything is possible" standard allowed the court to ignore these
"accidents." As noted above, however, the MCM requires a showing that
likelihood of death or serious bodily harm be the "natural and probable
consequence" of the defendant's conduct in aggravated assault cases.
The threshold used to convict Dacus seems considerably lower than the
standard approved in the MCM.
There are four possible reasons for this result, each of which fails to
justify the lower standard. First, the military courts may have interpreted
the MCM this way in all aggravated assault cases. That is not the case,
however. For example, in United States v. Corralez, where the defendant
placed a knife to his victim's head and threatened to cut her face with
broken glass, the AFCCA made a clear distinction between mere

"8 Id. at 96-97. Since Dacus was sentenced in 2005, viral load tests have
become increasingly sensitive, lowering the "undetectable" threshold to 40
copies/mL. Wilson et al., supra note 36.
184

115

Id. at 96.
Id. at 101-02.

Dacus, 66 M.J. at 238. Dacus argued on appeal that his statements during his
providence inquiry did not adduce sufficient facts to warrant conviction of
aggravated assault because Dr. Wallace's testimony defeated a finding of
likelihood. Id.
186

' See discussion supranote 155.
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possibility and the governing standard in aggravated assault cases. 88 The
court noted that "likely" means "more than a mere possibility that death
or . . . harm will occur. Death or grievous bodily harm must be the

'natural and probable consequence' before it can be said that the use of a
weapon, means, or force was likely to cause death or grievous bodily
injury." 89 In fact, the only cases in which "natural and probable" is
equated with the kind of simple possibility embraced by the "more than
merely a fanciful, speculative, or remote" standard are those involving
HIV-positive defendants. Unless there is some other justification, this
seems like obvious discrimination. An entire class of defendants, those
who allegedly use their HIV as an instrument of harm, are subject to a
lower standard of proof than is every other defendant charged with
aggravated assault.
Second, the military seems to have confused risk of transmission
with risk of harm. If aggravated assault under the UCMJ requires a
means likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death, a judge could
interpret "likely" as modifying only "cause." This suggests that given an
attack by the particular weapon or means used, what is important for the
likelihood prong is the probability of death or serious injury once the
weapon is used. And, since HTV causes AIDS and AIDS is incurable and
leads to death, death is the natural and probable consequence of
contracting HIV. There is some indication that C.A.A.F. has adopted this
interpretation. For example, in United States v. Joseph, another
aggravated assault case involving HIV, the court analogized HIV to a
rifle bullet, stating that "the question would be whether the bullet is
likely to inflict death or serious bodily harm if it hits the victim, not the
statistical probability of the bullet hitting the victim." 90 That
interpretation is misleading, however. It is beyond cavil that great harm
or death must be a likely consequence. Joseph ignores the fact that it is
not the weapon that must likely cause great harm, but rather the manner
in which it is used must be likely to cause the resulting harm. As
C.A.A.F. explained in Outhier, "likely" modifies "means." The question
in Outhier was whether "the means were 'used in a manner likely' to
cause harm.'91 Fists could cause sufficient harm if used a certain way,
whereas a gun, if an attacker loads it with bubblegum and pulls the
trigger, could not. To narrow the likelihood prong to the consequential
" 61 M.J. 737, 740 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
" Id. at 742.
190 37 M.J. 392, 396-97 (C.M.A. 1993) (emphasis in original). In United States
v. Stewart, 29 M.J. 92 (C.M.A. 1989), furthermore, C.A.A.F. addressed the

foundational question of whether HIV qualifies as a means likely to produce
death or grievous bodily harm if, at the time, HIV developed into AIDS (which
was equated with death) only thirty to fifty percent of the time. A thirty to fifty
percent likelihood of developing AIDS satisfied the Court that AIDS was the
natural and probable consequence of contracting HIV. Id. at 93.
191 Outhier,45 M.J. 326, 329 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (emphasis added).
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harm, therefore, ignores the saliency of a particular weapon's use. What
is more, since there can be no harm without a risk of transmission of
HIV, any aggravated assault conviction must assess whether the
particular means employed-unprotected sex by an HIV-positive man
with an undetectable viral load-would naturally and probably transmit
HIV.192
Third, C.A.A.F. might have justified its low risk of transmission
standard on its assumption that an HIV infection is an unquestioned
death sentence. In other words, if the gravity of the harm is so great, the
risk of transmission of HIV need not be. Indeed, that is what United
States v. Weatherspoon appears to suggest.19 3 Weatherspoon was a
traditional aggravated assault case involving choking and repeated kicks
to the head. C.A.A.F. cited LeFave for the proposition that the

192 Even if the Joseph standard were correct, and the only applicable question
was harm to the body as a result of an HIV infection, the prosecution should
still have to prove that serious bodily injury or death were "natural and probable
consequences" of contracting HIV. The courts in Johnson, Joseph, and Klauck
accepted this as true, but given current medical treatments, the point is
debatable. Though a comprehensive summary of the status of HIV treatments is
beyond the scope of this paper, recent clinical trials, reported by the Department
of Health and Human Services, found that patients receiving two drug
combinations of AIDS drugs had up to fifty percent increases in time from HIV
to AIDS progression and in survival when compared to people receiving singledrug therapy. Three drug combinations, first prescribed in any widespread form
in the early 2000s, produced another fifty to eighty percent improvement in
progression from HIV to AIDS and in survival when compared to two-drug
regimens. See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, The Evidence that HIV Causes AIDS,
Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (last updated Jan. 14, 2010), http://
www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/hivaids/understanding/howhivcausesaids/pages/hivca
usesaids.aspx (discussing these statistics near the bottom of the webpage in a
section titled: Answering the Skeptics: Responses to Arguments that HIV Does
Not Cause Aids). Use of these anti-HIV combination therapies has also
contributed to dramatic reductions in the incidence of AIDS and AIDS-related
deaths in the country to the point where life expectancy of HIV-positive
individuals is only slightly below average. See, e.g., Frank J. Palella et al.,
Declining Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients with Advanced Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 853 (1998); Mocroft
et al., Changing Patterns of Mortality Across Europe in Patients Infected with
HIV-1, 352 LANCET 1725 (Nov. 28, 1998); Eric Vittinghoff et al., Combination
Antiretroviral Therapy and Recent Declines in AIDS Incidence and Mortality,
179 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 717 (Mar. 1999); Schwarcz et al., Impact of
Protease Inhibitors and Other Antiretroviral Treatments on Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome Survival in San Francisco,California,1987-1996,
152 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 178 (2000). Admittedly, this ignores other arguable
categories of bodily harm, such as the side effects these drugs can cause.
'" 49 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
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concept of likelihood ... has two prongs: (1) the risk of
harm and (2) the magnitude of the harm. . . .
[L]ikelihood

. . . is determined by measuring both

prongs, not just the statistical risk of harm. Where the
magnitude of the harm is great, there may be an
aggravated assault, even though the risk of harm is

statistically low.19 4
Not only is this theory not universally applied,195 it is also nothing
more than a post hoc justification for the military courts' unequal
treatment of HIV-positive criminal defendants charged with aggravated
assault. Weatherspoon accepts the "more than merely a fanciful,
speculative, or remote" standard as given, relying on various C.A.A.F.
precedents that neither discussed LeFave nor indicated a reliance on an
inverse variation to determine likelihood. In those cases, the magnitude
of harm was assumed to be great because HIV/AIDS is incurable.196 Yet,
C.A.A.F. uses the MCM's "natural and probable consequence" standard
for typical aggravated assaults and LeFave's inverse variation for HIVrelated assaults.
Since C.A.A.F. created its "more than merely a fanciful, speculative,
or remote" standard long before Weatherspoon's use of LeFave's inverse
variation to justify it, it would seem that there is a fourth possibility.
Perhaps the military courts have continued to perpetuate a mistake made
long ago, when judges were scared and ignorant of HIV.19 7 The
194 Id. at 211 (citing 1 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, §

3.7 at 328 (1986)).
195 See, e.g., Corralez, 61 M.J. 737, 742 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
196 This made it easy for Weatherspoon to rely on the MCM's "natural and
probable consequences" standard for the magnitude of harm prong. See 49 M.J.
at 212. The cases relied on by Weatherspoon-Johnson and Joseph-were
decided in 1990 and 1993, at the height of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and
paranoia.
197 Even the court in Johnson conceded rampant stigmatization of HIV-positive
criminal defendants, noting that judges at the time had moved "sentencing
proceedings to the courthouse parking lot, stating that 'lots of space and
sunshine' would reduce the risk of the defendant's infecting court personnel
with AIDS" and also required defendants with AIDS to enter pleas and receive
sentences over the phone. United States v. Johnson, 30 M.J. 53, 58 n.9 (C.M.A.
1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Stigmatization and
discrimination was not isolated to the courts. During the 1980s, for example,
many states mandated screening and testing, compulsory notification of AIDS
cases, restrictions of the right to anonymity, prohibition of HIV-infected
individuals from certain occupations, and even medical isolation and detention.
Tomasevski, K. et al., AIDS and Human Rights, in AIDS INTHE WORLD 537 (J.
Mann et al. eds. 1992). Social ostracization also took the form of housing
discrimination, calls for a quarantine of HIV-positive individuals, and parents
calling for HIV-positive students to be restricted from the classroom. PUBLIC
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precedents upon which the "more than merely a fanciful, speculate, or
remote possibility" standard is based are unsubstantiated and
Weatherspoon's post hoc justification for it does not suggest otherwise.
The cases bear this out. In Dacus, C.A.A.F. cites its previous decisions in
Klauk, Joseph, and Johnson for support;' 98 Klauk cites Joseph, which in
turn relied on Johnson.'99 Johnson relied on United States v. Stewart and
United States v. Womack,2 00 but that is where the precedents end.

Moreover, neither Stewart nor Womack provide any reason for lowering
the MCM's natural and probable consequences standard other than
judicial fiat. Stewart employed the MCM's standard without mentioning
the words fanciful, speculative, or remote. 2 0 1 And Womack is even less
helpful and more far afield, as it never even addressed the natural and
probable consequences standard. In Womack, the appellant neither
pleaded to nor was charged with aggravated assault. Instead, he pleaded
guilty to forcible (oral) sodomy and violating the military's safe sex
order.202 The appellant challenged the validity of the safe sex order based
on overbreadth, intrusiveness, and a lack of military necessity, but the
court rejected those claims. 20 3 In doing so, the court neither mentioned
aggravated assault nor its requirement of a means likely to produce death
or grievous bodily harm. To say that Womack and Stewart required
Johnson to adopt the low "more than merely a fanciful, speculative, or

MEDIA CENTER, THE IMPACT OF HOMOPHOBIA AND OTHER SOCIAL BIASES ON
AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT BY THE PUBLIC MEDIA CENTER 17-22 (1995).

Throughout the 1980s, hundreds of HIV-positive young gay men were expelled
from school and subjected to violence. D. KIRP ET AL., LEARNING BY HEART:
AIDS AND SCHOOLCHILDREN IN AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES (1989). There were
many incidents of workers refusing to work next to HIV-positive individuals in
the manufacturing sector, and some companies have used HIV-status as a
reason to deny employment to individuals with HIV. Lawrence 0. Gostin &
David W. Webber, DiscriminationBased on HIV/AIDS and Other Conditions:
"Disability"As Defined Under Federaland State Law, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. &

POL'Y 266 (2000). Although certain states still refuse to protect the employment
rights of HIV-positive individuals, the specter of such discrimination in 2010
pales in comparison to the late 1980s and early 1990s.
198 United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citing United
States v. Klauck, 47 M.J. 24, 25 (C.A.A.F. 1997); Johnson, 30 M.J. at 57; and
United States v. Joseph, 37 M.J. 392, 396-97 (C.M.A. 1993)).
'99 Klauck, 47 M.J. at 25-26 (citing Joseph for the "more than merely a fanciful,
speculative, or remote possibility" standard). Joseph, 37 M.J. at 396-97 (citing
Johnson for same).
200 30 M.J. at 57 ("Based upon our holdings in Stewart and Womack, ['likely']
must at least be more than merely a fanciful, speculative, or remote
possibility."); United States v. Stewart, 29 M.J. 92 (C.M.A. 1989); United States
v. Womack, 29 M.J. 88 (C.M.A. 1989).
201

202

Stewart, 29 M.J. at 93.
Womack, 29 M.J. at 88.

203 id.
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remote possibility" standard is to read into the cases something that is
simply not there.
Even the Court's language in Dacus indicates awareness of this
problem. In tracing this history, C.A.A.F. is uneasy with its precedents,
noting only that "in explaining the first [likelihood] prong, we relied
upon the 'risk of harm' definition developed in several HIV assault
cases" and that those earlier cases relied "on language from an earlier
HIV assault case. ,,204 As iif punting responsibility for the precedential
quagmire in which it found itself, C.A.A.F. never affirmed a standard,
merely noting that it has for years been relying on certain precedents that
rely on other precedents.2 05
This jurisprudential quicksand doomed Sergeant Dacus's appeal.
Even though his undetectable viral load made him significantly less
likely than a hypothetical HIV-positive individual to transmit HIV, the
fact that anything is possible satisfied the "more than merely a fanciful,
speculative, or remote possibility" standard.206 There are two major
problems with the decision in Dacus. First, specific proof was available
and before the military judge, yet the general rule of thumb was still
applied despite unique circumstances: another Accident Fallacy. This
occurred because of the second error-the bar for proving likelihood had
been previously set well below the instructions of the MCM to the
lowest "mere possibility" standard. Therefore, even specific proof as to
the qualitative and quantitative unlikelihood that Dacus could transmit
HIV was insufficient to rebut the government's case. If all the
government had to prove was a mere possibility that was more than
"fanciful, speculative, or remote," even the medical reality that
"anything is possible" would suffice. After all, the testifying physicians
in Dacus, Johnson, Klauck, and Joseph all stated that the likelihood of
transmission was relatively low, albeit possible. But, proof of possibility
is not proof of likelihood beyond a reasonable doubt.
V. CANADA'S USE OF ITS CRIMINAL LAW

These due process errors are not inherent in aggravated assault cases.
That is, there is no reason why charges for aggravated assault will
always result in the use of generalized proof and exceedingly low
thresholds for proof of guilt. The Weeks court and the military courts
may have adopted the "Anything is Possible" standard and Dacus may
be an example of the erroneous use of generalized rules-of-thumb as
evidence of guilt, but such errors were products of interpretation rather
United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
Concurring in the result in Dacus, Judges Baker and Ryan suggested that had
Dacus not pleaded guilty, they were prepared to look critically at the case
history. Id. at 240-41 (Ryan, J., concurring).
206 Id. at 239-40.
204
205
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than the governing regime itself. Canada has used its common law crime
of aggravated sexual assault to punish the criminal transmission of HIV
and it has generally avoided these mistakes. If American jurisdictions
took the Canadian example to heart, aggravated assault could survive as
a traditional criminal law tool for prosecuting these crimes.
Aggravated sexual assault is governed by Section 273(1) of
Canada's Criminal Code: "Every one [sic] commits an aggravated sexual
assault who, in committing a sexual assault, wounds, maims, disfigures
or endangers the life of the complainant." 207 The government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's actions endangered the life
of the complainant and that the accused intentionally used force without
consent.208 Consent can be vitiated by proof of fraud, but given the
severity of the crime compared with simple assault, "only a significant
risk of harm . . . will suffice" 209 to vitiate consent. Therefore, the sexual
acts must have exposed the victim to a significant risk of harm.
There have been three HIV-related cases to come before the
Canadian Supreme Court since 1993. Regina v. Thornton was a product
of its time, as it came before the court early in the HIV epidemic, and
therefore provides little guidance on the modern adjudication of the
crime.210 Thornton was HIV-positive when he donated his blood to the
Red Cross. He was not charged with assault, but rather with committing
a common nuisance and thereby endangering the public under Section
180 of the Canadian Criminal Code. As sufficient proof of the statute's
"endangering" element, the Ontario Court of Appeals took judicial notice
of the fact that the presence of HIV antibodies indicates an AIDS
infection and that AIDS is a grave and contagious illness.21' It seems that
the endangerment element is synonymous with an assessment of the risk
to the body upon contraction of HIV. In R. v. Cuerrier,the defendant was
charged with aggravated assault for having unprotected sexual
intercourse with two victims, but even though the court required a
"significant risk to the lives of the complainants occasioned by the act of
unprotected intercourse," it found "no doubt" that the defendant

Canada Criminal Code [hereinafter CCC], R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 273.
R. v. Mabior, 2008 MBQB 201, T. 8-9 (Can.), rev'd, 2010 MBCA 93.
209 R. v. J.A.T., 2010 BCSC 766, T 54-5 (Can.) (quoting R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2
S.C.R. 371, T 132 (Can.)).
210 R. v. Thornton (1991), 1 O.R. 3d 480 (Ont.
C.A.).
211 Id. at 481 (stating "[a]ll of this is now well known"). It is not clear from the
decision how the court concluded that those statements were "well-known."
Even in 1991, the medical community agreed that the presence of HIV
antibodies in a person's blood did not necessary mean that the person had
AIDS. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 30 M.J. 53 (C.M.A. 1990) (stating
that "under many circumstances," AIDS results from exposure to HIV).

207

208
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endangered his victims' lives by exposing them to HIV. 2 12 The court did
not discuss the basis for determining a significant risk, but considered
risk in terms of the risk of harm. The court was certain that the
defendant's conduct met the standard because "[t]he potentially lethal
consequences of infection permit no other conclusion." 2 13
The third HIV case from the Supreme Court of Canada was R. v.
Williams.2 14 In Williams, like Cuerrier, the accused was HIV-positive
and had unprotected sexual intercourse with the complainant. The unique
feature in Williams is that the accused may already have infected the
complainant with HIV before he knew that he was HIV-positive. To
prove aggravated assault, the Crown had to establish the concurrence of
the accused's intent and the consequences that made the conduct
aggravated assault, i.e., the endangerment. The prosecution failed
because if the accused endangered the complainant's life by the acts of
unprotected sexual intercourse, there was no intent. When he continued
to have unprotected sexual intercourse with the complainant after he
knew he was HIV-positive, the Crown could not show that the sexual
conduct "harmed the complainant, or even exposed her to a significant
risk of harm, because at that point she was possibly, and perhaps likely,
already infected with HIV."2 15 There were, then, two holdings in
Williams: as to the sexual acts before the defendant knew he was HIVpositive, there could be no intent to harm; as to any subsequent sexual
acts, there could be no risk to the victim since she had already been
exposed to and contracted HIV.
None of these cases speaks to the question of what specific kind of
conduct both risks the transmission of HIV and poses a significant risk
of harm. It was simply not at issue in Cuerrier or Williams, but it is
relevant because there can be no substantial harm without conduct that
risks transmission. It was not at issue in Williams because the parties
signed a safe-sex agreement in which they conceded that "a single act of
unprotected vaginal intercourse carries a significant risk of HIV
transmission." 2 16 Most lower courts that have interpreted Cuerrier have
agreed 2 17 and argue that advances in medical knowledge as to the risks of
R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 95 (Can.). Aggravated assault has the
same basic elements as aggravated sexual assault except for the required sexual
act. Section 268 of the Canadian Criminal Code states that "[e]very one [sic]
commits an aggravated assault who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the
life of the complainant." CCC, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 268.
213 R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371,
95 (Can.).
214 R. v. Williams, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134 (Can.).
215 Id.
T34.
216 R. v. Williams, 2001 NFCA 52, 17 (Can.).
217 See, e.g., R. v. Wright, 2009 BCCA 514 (Can.) (holding risk
of transmission
relevant to determining risk of significant bodily harm to complainant and
finding a jury could rationally find that a 5 in 1,000 risk was sufficient); R. v.
212
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transmission necessarily require an investigation into transmission risks
as well as the potential for grave harm. 218 Nor did Cuerrierestablish an
evidentiary rule that all unprotected sex constituted a substantial risk and
all protected sex constituted an insubstantial risk. 2 19 All Cuerrierdid was
establish that a significant risk of harm will vitiate consent when
combined with deceit. Otherwise, risk had to be "a matter of fact to be
assessed on the evidence in each and every case." 220 Lower courts were
empowered by Cuerrierto use case-specific evidence to prove the level
of risk, thus ensuring that "personal guilt" would be a feature of any
conviction for an HIV-related aggravated assault.
In R. v. JA. T, for example, the defendant engaged in unprotected
anal intercourse with his same-sex partner at various times throughout
their relationship. 221 He knew he was HIV-positive before they met, but
never disclosed his status until he faked a positive HIV test about nine
months later.222 The government charged him with aggravated sexual
assault and since his partner had consented to every incident of
intercourse, the government also had to prove a substantial risk of harm.
The court read Cuerrier as establishing the basic principle that a
substantial risk was necessary to vitiate consent and since there could be
no harm without a risk of transmission, sufficient evidence was
necessary to prove a substantial risk of both transmission and harm. Two
S.(F.), 2006 CarswellOnt 1539 (Ont. C.A.) (WL) (similar); R. v. Mabior, 2008
MBQB 201 (Can.), rev'd, 2010 MBCA 93 (noting that risk of transmission is
essential threshold question and finding that an undetectable viral load plus the
use of a condom will never constitute a "substantial risk" of transmission). It
can be argued that these courts misinterpreted Cuerrier in that, by only
discussing the gravity of harm to the body upon infection, like C.A.A.F. did in
Joseph, supra note 192, the "substantial risk" did not refer to risk of
transmission. That reading is plausible, but myopic. The risk of transmission
was somehow not at issue in Cuerrierbecause the defense conceded that sex is
one way HIV can be transmitted The court therefore assumed a risk of
transmission without deciding it. The lower courts in various provinces have
concluded that, since there can be no harm to the body without a risk of
transmission, the "substantial risk" standard applies to both the risk of
transmission and gravity of the harm. This distinguishes Canadian courts from
American military courts, which have used a "merely more than a fanciful,
speculative, or remote possibility" standard when determining risk of
transmission, but a "natural and probable consequences" standard when
determining risk of harm. See supra Part IV. B.: The Sex Cases.
218

See e.g., R. v. J.A.T., 2010 BCSC 766,121 (Can.).

R. v. T.(J.), 2008 BCCA 463, . 18-19 (Can.).
Id. 19-20.
221 JA.T., 2010 BCSC, TT 32-53 (finding that a review of all the evidence and
219

220

the credibility of the witnesses suggests that there were three incidents of
unprotected sexual intercourse during the defendant's and the complainant's
ten-month relationship).
222
Id. T 12.
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experts in infectious disease testified at trial. The first concluded that the
risk of transmission in this case was 4 in 10,000 per incident of anal
intercourse. He took into account the defendant's low viral load and that
the HIV-positive defendant was the receptive rather than insertive sexual
partner, which decreased the risk of transmission. He also considered
that the complainant was uncircumcised, which increased the risk.223
This evidence typifies the kind of specific proof absent from cases like
Weeks, Scroggins, Johnson, and others. Whereas the general rule of

thumb is that unprotected anal intercourse carries a 1.4 percent risk of
transmission,224 the unique "accidents" of the defendant's case in J.A. T
distinguished it from the norm. His viral load and his sexual position
served to lower the risk, whereas the fact that his HIV-negative partner
was uncircumcised increased the risk. Specific proof, therefore, will not
always absolve a defendant of culpability by reducing the risk of
transmission; certain "accidents" can increase the risk over and above
the average, making proof of a substantial risk of transmission easier.
As to risk or gravity of the harm upon infection, a second medical
expert testified that HIV is no longer synonymous with death.225 She
noted that an HIV-positive individual can have "a normal life
expectancy" with antiretroviral drugs and new treatments that reduce the
incidence of side effects.226 Hypothetically, treatment can also lower the
viral load of an HIV-positive person to undetectable levels. 227 Although
the court noted that there is still no cure for HIV or AIDS, it is no longer
a certainty that AIDS is deadly. Given the testimony of both physicians
and the unique circumstances of the case, the court found that the
government could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant exposed his partner to a substantial enough risk.228
In other cases, Canadian courts have distinguished between those
defendants whose actions did not carry a substantial risk of
transmission-for example, those with undetectable viral loads who used
condoms-and those defendants whose actions did carry a substantial
risk, because they had high viral loads and had unprotected sex on
multiple occasions.229 At a minimum, these individuals are distinct and
the criminal law can treat them as such. Notwithstanding emotional and
retributive reactions to any occasion in which a sexual partner hides his
223 Id. T 29.

Rebecca F. Baggaley et al., HIV Transmission Risk Through Anal
Intercourse: Systematic Review, Meta-Analysis and Implications for HIV
Prevention,
29 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1048, 1055 (2010).
22 5
224

JA.T., 2010 BCSC,

Id. TT 22-23.
227 Id. T 23-24.
228 Id. T 88.

22.

226

R. v. Mabior, 2008 MBQB 201, T 143-44, 149-50, 152-54 (Can.), rev'd,
2010 MBCA 93.
229
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or her communicable disease, it should be recognized that HIV-positive
criminal defendants have unique characteristics that distinguish them
from one another. A specific defendant's behavior and disease as well as
the sexual act at issue should all be considered individually. Canada's
approach in JA.T suggests that a court can make these classifications
and still use the criminal law to punish culpable behavior without
recourse to generalities, exceedingly low standards of proof, or
violations of long-standing principles of due process.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The success of a "personal guilt" approach in JA.T shows that the
traditional criminal law can punish transmission of HIV without errors in
logic and violations of due process. But it is a risky recipe. Problematic
cases like Brock, Scroggins, Weeks, Johnson, and Dacus show a
tendency toward error that even more specific drafting could not resolve.
Even if legislatures were clear about what "tends to" or "likelihood"
meant, for example, courts could disregard them, as was the case with
the military courts' creation of the more than "fanciful, speculative, or
remote possibility" standard in spite of the MCM's "natural and probable
consequences" instruction. Inasmuch as this difficulty stems from the
use of the crime of aggravated assault to prosecute transmission of HIV,
perhaps the traditional criminal law is not the best tool for this purpose.
Without a doubt, these cases constitute a public health concern-the
spread of HIV and AIDS, regardless of current treatments that may make
the diseases manageable, is something the State has a compelling interest
in stopping. The aggravated assault approach, however, has proven overinclusive, by reaching HIV-positive individuals with low viral loads and
no intent to harm when the real concern is with men like Nushawn
Williams and Philippe Padieu who maliciously planned to infect as many
women as possible with HIV 2 30 At a minimum, then, jurisdictions that
continue to use the traditional criminal law in this context should
recognize the potential logical fallacies and due process errors that can
occur and guard against them. When likelihood of harm is at issue,
prosecutors should introduce evidence of the defendant's viral load or
some measure of the status of the defendant's HIV as a means of proving
likelihood. Defendants likewise should introduce evidence of their low
viral load to raise doubts about whether they could have likely
transmitted the disease. And, judges should pay attention. Even if parties
to litigation begin to introduce this evidence, three troubling wider
implications will remain.
First, jurisdictions that have adjudicated these cases either make the
dubious assumption that the criminal law can effectively deter behavior
that risks spreading HIV or are charging HIV-related aggravated assaults
230
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under purely retributive statutes.231 These regimes do not achieve
effective deterrence. As one Canadian court noted in comparison, the
crime of knowingly transmitting a venereal disease was repealed in
1985, but there had not been a prosecution under the section since
1922.232 Similarly, before the United States Supreme Court overturned
state anti-sodomy laws as violating due process, 233 studies showed that
for every twenty sodomy convictions, six million acts went
undetected.234 If the purpose of using the aggravated assault statute is to
stop the spread of HIV, the problem of detection is fatal to its success. In
1986, the Surgeon General's Report on AIDS estimated that over 1.5
million people showing no HIV or AIDS-related symptoms may be
infected with HIV and capable of infecting others.235 In 2008, Professor
Kenneth Mayer found that more than twenty percent of Americans with
HIV do not know they are infected.236 These individuals, even if
engaging in unprotected sex with various partners, could not be found to
possess the requisite intent of an assault provision. Strict liability statutes
that require no intent to harm may capture this conduct, but they are
over-inclusive, may amount to an intrusive "no sex" policy against HIVpositive individuals, and would also, obviously, not prevent such
conduct.
Therefore, these statutes have little deterrent value. The retributive
criminalization of HIV transmission would have some merit if we
accepted the legitimacy of purely punitive criminal statutes, 237 but this
231

For a discussion of deterrent theory of the criminal law, see Steven
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would be acceptable only if such criminalization only targeted people
like NeShawn Williams who intended to harm as many people as
possible. But, as we have seen, intent is not always an element of the
offense in HIV-related aggravated assaults. The logical and due process
problems discussed herein threaten to victimize all HIV-positive
individuals in certain jurisdictions, not just those who intend to spread
the virus with impunity and without remorse.
Criminalization would no more effectively deter the spread of HIV
than the imposition of tort liability. Victims of sexual partners who did
not disclose their HIV-positive status have sought and obtained money
damages, ranging from $25,000 to $12.5 million, for pain and suffering
after exposure to the virus.238 It is unlikely, however, that monetary
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress would stop the
spread of HIV, and to conclude otherwise from a smattering of HIVrelated tort liability cases ignores the reality of HIV transmission.2 39
Those groups most at risk for HIV and most likely to transmit the
disease-young and poor gay men, teenagers, sex workers, intravenous
drug users, and low-income minorities (the fastest growing group)-are
unlikely to change their behavior based on the potential imposition of
financial penalties since they tend to be judgment proof. Furthermore,
the immaturity of younger at-risk groups and drug addicts means that
they are less likely to be rational actors. It is also unclear that tort
liability would alter the behavior of relatively low risk populations such
as upper middle-class Caucasian couples. Low-risk populations often
accompany unsafe sex practices with drug or alcohol use, behavior
which compromises an individual's ability to think rationally or to think
ahead to future consequences.
Second, while adjudicating HIV-related aggravated assault cases in
general, and the risks of transmission and gravity of harm elements in
particular, courts must be willing to account for advances in medical
knowledge and treatment regimes. 2 40 It is beyond doubt that scientific
knowledge of HIV/AIDS, its pathogenesis, its progression and its
prognosis, is strikingly different today than when the first HIV-related
aggravated assault cases shocked state legislatures in the late 1980s. We
Waldman, Tormented: A Critique of the Retributive CriminalizationofBullying,

84 TEMP. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
Robinson v. Louie, No. 97-30448 (U.S. Bankr. N.D.C.A. Aug. 3, 1998),
available at http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/print/912; John B. v. Superior Court,
238

137 P.3d 153 (Cal. 2006); Joanna Lin, Ex-Wife with HIV Awarded Millions,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, http://articles.Iatimes.com/2008/nov/25/local/mehivsuit25.
239 This is an example of the Fallacy of hasty generalization. See supra note
122.
240 See generally McArthur, supra note 11, at 725-31 (discussing the changing
medical picture of HIV and AIDS and its implications for questions of
culpability).
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now know that any number of factors affect risks of transmission of HIV,
including viral load, other injuries or abrasions, sexual positions, and the
stage of the HIV-positive partner's disease. New treatments can also
reduce an HIV-positive individual's viral load, thus reducing his risk of
transmitting the virus to another as compared to a non-treated
individual. 241 We also know that HIV will not necessarily develop into
AIDS, as that progression depends upon the strength of the immune
system, the HIV stage, the viral load, and any anti-retroviral treatment.242
And this only scratches the surface. 243 Legal standards crafted at the
height of public hysteria, or simply before HIV and AIDS became more
manageable illnesses, force modem judges into antiquated judgments
when it comes to risk of transmission and severity of harm. To guard
against that eventuality, the best medical knowledge should be used to
update the criminal law's approach.
Third, the implications of a criminal conviction do not end with jail.
The resulting stigmatization may be the most troubling. Michael Closen
has argued that President Reagan's lack of public discussion of the HIV
issue after it first emerged and the Supreme Court's subsequent refusal to
address HIV-positive individuals' rights made "silence and avoidance"
acceptable responses to the epidemic.2 44 This further stigmatized the
HIV-positive population and contributed to rights abuses, increased the
risk of transmission by encouraging concealment of status, and set back
treatment efforts.245 By charging HIV-positive individuals with crimes
like aggravated assault, prosecutors associate HIV with a "weapon" or
"instrument of harm." HIV-positive individuals already suffer
stigmatization without the criminal law's attempt to fit a novel incident
with the language of a traditional crime. To suggest that HIV is a weapon
perpetuates a culture that discriminates against HIV-positive individuals
in the workplace24 6 and in the provision of medical services,247 to name

Julio S. G. Montaner et al., The Case for Expanding Access to Highly Active
AntiretroviralTherapy to Curb the Growth of the HIV Epidemic, 368 LANCET
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just a couple of contexts. If aggravated assault charges do not work as
effective deterrents to risky sexual behavior, they are not worth the
added stigma that they thrust upon individuals whose conduct could
hardly be considered risky in the first place. A public health approach,
like the one taken by various governments to counteract the spread of
syphilis, may be a more effective response to the problem.248
At best, the problem of criminalization is one of overinclusiveness-using general rules-of-thumb to describe too many
peculiar and unique cases. At worst, it is one of stereotyping, which is
itself a product of ignorance. The average voter, prosecutor, or judge
may think that sex transmits HIV, that HIV leads to AIDS and that HIV
kills, but those "rules-of-thumb" are not universally applicable. Birds do
fly, but not all of them. Sexual intercourse can transmit HIV, but when an
undetectable viral load is combined with anti-retroviral treatment and
condom use, the statistical probability of transmission is basically nil.
Such conduct should rarely, if ever, create a likelihood of transmission
sufficient for conviction under an aggravated assault statute. In fact,
See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (discussing a dentist who
refused to fill cavity of an HIV-positive patient unless it was done in a hospital
at the expense of the patient).
247

Stephen Kenney, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons from History
and a Model for the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245 (1992).
Professor Kenney concluded that non-coercive responses by governments,
including voluntary HIV testing, education and counseling may be the most
beneficial approach. "A review of the public health response to syphilis
indicates that the coercive elements were unsuccessful in comparison with noncoercive programs. Several of the non-coercive programs initiated in the
syphilis era have achieved some early success in the fight to control HIV
infection. If these programs are to continue to be successful, their objectives
must not be thwarted by the use of criminal statutes that perpetuate the public's
fears that HIV can be transmitted by casual contact or make knowledge of HIV
infection an element of the offense. Statutes that criminalize virtually any act by
persons who know of their HIV infection discourage participation in HIV
testing and treatment programs. AIDS-specific statutes that impose liability only
for behavior medically proven to transmit HIV and incorporate a defense of
informed consent are the preferred means of criminalizing the intentional
transmission of HIV. However, even the most narrowly drafted HIV criminal
statute may prove to be counterproductive in the fight against HIV infection. A
statute that requires defendants to know of their HIV infection at the time of the
criminal act will discourage persons from determining their HIV status and
entering education and treatment programs. The social and economic cost of
this strategy outweighs any benefit likely to result from prosecuting the few
individuals who use the intentional transmission of HIV as a means of causing
serious injury or death to another person." Id. at 272-73. See also, Int'l
Consultation on the Criminalization of HIV Transmission, 17(33) J.
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 180(7) (May 1, 2009); Isabel Grant, The
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various scholars have argued that safe sex practices are so important and
so relevant to the risk of transmission of HIV that the criminal law
should distinguish between protected and unprotected sex in HIV
exposure and nondisclosure cases.249 Different HIV viral loads should be
distinguished in the same way.

Isabel Grant, Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in
HIV NondisclosureProsecutions,54 McGILL L. J. 389 (2009).
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